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Abstract
We introduce an alternative conceptual basis for default reasoning in Reiter’s default logic. In fact,
most formal or computational treatments of default logic suffer from the necessity of exhaustive
consistency checks with respect to the finally resulting set of conclusions; often this so-called
extension is just about being constructed. On the theoretical side, this exhaustive approach is
reflected by the usual fixed-point characterizations of extensions. Our goal is to reduce such global
considerations to local and strictly necessary ones. For this purpose, we develop various techniques
and instruments that draw on an analysis of interaction patterns between default rules, embodied by
their mutual blocking behavior. These formal tools provide us with alternative means for addressing
a variety of questions in default logic. We demonstrate the utility of our approach by applying it
to three traditional problems. First, we obtain a range of criteria guaranteeing the existence and
non-existence of extensions. Second, we get alternative characterizations of extensions that avoid
fixed-point conditions. Finally, we furnish a formal account of default proofs that was up to now
neglected in the literature. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Nonmonotonic reasoning; Default logic; Argumentation; Automated reasoning; Knowledge
representation; Block graph; Consistency
1. Introduction
Default reasoning plays an important role in artificial intelligence systems since many
underlying tasks involve reasoning from incomplete information. Reiter’s default logic [40]
is among the best known and most widely studied logical frameworks for addressing this
form of reasoning. Apart from its natural and lucid language, it is also more expressive than
competing formalisms, like Datalog with negation [9] or even circumscription [36]. That
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is, it can express succinctly knowledge situations where only exponential representations
are available in the latter formalisms [8,24].
Default logic augments classical logic by default rules that differ from standard
inference rules in sanctioning inferences that rely upon given as well as absent information.
Knowledge is represented in default logic by default theories (D,W) consisting of a set of
formulasW and a set of default rules D. A default rule α :β
γ
has two types of antecedents:
A prerequisite α which is established if α is derivable and a justification β which is
established if β cannot be refuted. If both conditions hold, the consequent γ is concluded.
In this way, a default theory may induce zero, one or multiple extensions of the facts in W .
The formal definition of extensions turns out to be more delicate than could have been
expected. This is due to the context-sensitive nature of justifications. In fact, a default
rule’s justification could be refuted only just when all default conclusions contributing to
an extension are known. This is why traditionally the non-refutability, or consistency, of
a justification is verified with respect to the final extension. This leads to the usual fixed-
point characterizations of extensions. In such an approach, one is obliged to inspect the
entire set of default rules in order to decide whether a particular default rule applies.
The goal of this paper is to furnish instruments that allow us to replace such exhaustive
considerations by the strictly necessary ones. Our approach is based on the observation
that the refutation of a justification is necessarily based on the existence of a proof for its
negation. Although the default rules in these proofs are context-dependent, they delineate
the set of rules that are relevant for establishing the consistency of a justification. The idea
is thus to analyze default theories in order to extract all such interaction patterns among
default rules in order to draw on this information for eliminating the reference to a final
extension. In this way, the set of default rules must be inspect only once in its entirety,
while subsequent considerations can be restricted to the extracted interaction patterns.
Our objective is nicely illustrated by applying it to the extension-membership problem,
which is concerned with deciding whether a default theory has an extension containing a
given formula. Consider an example where birds fly, birds have wings, penguins are birds,
and penguins don’t fly along with a formalization through default theory
(D,W)=
({
b : ¬abb
f
,
b : w
w
,
p : b
b
,
p : ¬abp
¬f
}
,
{¬f → abb, f → abp,p}
)
. (1)
We let δf , δw , δb, δ¬f abbreviate the previous default rules by appeal to their consequents.
An analysis of these rules should provide us with the information that the application of
the first rule depends on the blockage of the last one (and vice versa). The second and third
rule can be applied no matter which of the other rules apply. We may thus infer¬f by fully
ignoring the second and the third rule, while assuring that the first one is blocked. Notably,
our initial analysis must be truly global and also extend to putatively unrelated parts of
the theory. To see this, simply add the rule :x¬x , abbreviated ζ¬x , destroying all previous
extensions consistent with x . Now, the application of each rule depends additionally on
the blockage of ζ¬x . Hence, we can apply δ¬f to derive ¬f , only if both δf and ζ¬x are
blocked.
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We see that the application of rules depends on the blockage of other rules. The outcome
of our analysis must thus provide information on which rules may block other rules (or
even themselves). This is why we provide a formal account of rule interaction in terms
of so-called blocking sets. They provide context-independent candidate proofs for refuting
a default rule’s justification. But although we may allot somehow unlimited time to an
analysis (seen as a compilation phase) we cannot provide unlimited space for its result.
This is also crucial in our context, since the blocking information may be exponential in
the size of the number of defaults. We address this problem by proposing a so-called block
graph. This construct is obtained by abstracting from particular blocking situations, while
keeping the essential interaction patterns between default rules. The size of the block graph
is quadratic in the number of defaults. In the worst case, its computation has the same time
complexity as the extension-membership problem.
The block graph is our salient instrument for reducing extension-based issues to proof-
oriented ones; its gathered information can be used in various ways.
• We may draw on the block graph for addressing the existence-of-extension problem,
aiming at deciding whether a default theory has an extension. As a result, we obtain a
range of corresponding criteria that can be read off the block graph.
In fact, this problem shows also up in our initial example. In addition to the rules
needed for deriving a formula, we may furthermore have to consider rules menacing
an encompassing extension, like ζ¬x .
• Furthermore, we obtain novel characterizations of extensions by appeal to blockage-
based concepts. The resulting characterizations do not only avoid global consistency
checks, as needed in traditional characterizations, but they moreover eliminate the
usual fixed-point condition.
• Analogously, we obtain characterizations of default proofs by means of blockage-
based concepts that avoid referring to an encompassing extension.
Also, the block graph can be used for focusing the formation of such default proofs
on ultimately necessary defaults. In the above example, it will be the block graph
of Theory (1) that tells us that the derivation of ¬f through δ¬f requires that δf is
inapplicable and that the two other rules may be completely ignored.
What makes our approach thus different from traditional, extension-oriented ones is that
once we have extracted the blocking information subsequent problems can be addressed
by considering default rules only by need.
Throughout this paper, we have adopted a rigorous blockage-based view. Although this
notion was implicitly present in the literature, it has so far not been used as an explicit tool
for addressing issues in default logic. For illustration, let us reconsider the applicability
of default rules (cf. condition (3) of Definition 2.1). The blockage-based view lets us
distinguish three types of default theories:
(1) If a theory contains no (blocking) interactions among default rules, applicability
depends on the rule in focus only. For instance, the applicability of δ¬f in the
presence of δw and δb (and the absence of δf ) depends only on δ¬f itself. On such
non-conflicting theories, reasoning is reduced to deduction and can be accomplished
by means of the constituent rules only.
(2) A theory comprises direct interactions only, that is, the scope of each conflict affects
the involved rules only. Then, applicability depends on the given rule plus the
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applicability of its blocking rules. For example, in the presence of δf , δw , and δb
the applicability of δ¬f depends on δ¬f itself and δf . On such conflicting theories,
reasoning must be done in a consistent way accounting for interactions between
rules. Nonetheless, it can be accomplished by inspecting the constituent rules and
(recursively) their blocking rules. Other rules that do not interact with these rules
can be ignored.
(3) A theory comprises indirect interactions, that is, conflicts that affect the application
of rules outside the conflict. Now, applicability depends also on that of self-blocking
yet unrelated rules (in addition to that of the given rule and its blocking rules). For
instance, the applicability of δ¬f in the presence of δf , δw , δb, and ζ¬x depends on
δf , δ¬f , and ζ¬x . As we have seen, such theories may have no extensions.
This three-fold classification is actually reflected by many notions that are introduced in the
sequel. The first class is rather trivial, since it can be dealt with by standard logical means.
Non-conflicting theories play nonetheless the role of a base case whenever conflicts are
gradually removed from conflicting theories (see below). Much more interesting default
reasoning, involving conflicting information, is situated within the second class of theories.
As a matter of fact, the profile of the underlying conflicting rules is captured by the block
graph. The third class comprises the truly problematic theories. Clearly, the potential lack
of extensions may indicate a problem in the specification of the theory. However, it is the
danger of ill-formed yet unrelated rules that necessitates an exhaustive inspection of all
default rules in the general and thus most expressive case. In fact, the block graph provides
a way out of this dilemma because it allows us to decouple the existence of such ill-formed
rules from the necessity to inspect the entire set of rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a formal introduction to
default logic. Section 3 introduces blocking sets from which we construct a default theory’s
block graph. This section elaborates also upon the underlying formal properties and gives
further special-purpose concepts. The following three sections deal with applications
of these concepts. Section 4 addresses the existence-of-extensions problem. Section 5
provides alternative characterizations of extensions, while Section 6 is dedicated to the
conception of default proofs. Section 7 grasps the presented approach in its entirety and
discusses its impacts. Appendix A resumes some graph-theoretical background, needed
for the proofs given in Appendix B. Sections 3, 4, and 6 heavily extend the work found
in [30].
An extended version [32] of this paper contains further applications and refinements
of the approach, including results on modular and skeptical reasoning as well as further
insights into the relationship with variants of default logic. Also, it provides case studies
on graph coloring, Hamiltonian circuits and taxonomies that aim at underpinning the utility
of our approach.
1.1. Relationships to other work
The reduction of global concepts to local ones was already an issue in Reiter’s seminal
paper [40]. For capturing incremental constructions, Reiter isolated in [40] the property
of semi-monotonicity and already showed that this property is satisfied by the subclass of
normal default theories (see Section 2 on formal details). This has led in the following years
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to the development of alternative default logics, among them justified [34], cumulative [6]
and constrained default logic [16], all of which enjoy semi-monotonicity in full generality.
Interestingly, Reiter and Criscuolo showed in [41] that normal default theories lack
expressiveness and demonstrated that at least semi-normal default theories are needed for
full expressive power. Since such theories lack semi-monotonicity in Reiter’s default logic,
the descendants of the original approach seem to be the right choice. But despite the fact
that they allow for local constructions beyond normal default theories, they can also not
account for the full expressive power of Reiter’s default logic. In fact, as shown in [7],
full “local constructibility”, as embodied by semi-monotonicity, and full expressive power
are incompatible. As a consequence, we cannot adopt one of the seemingly computational
advantageous variants of default logic, if we want to keep the full expressive power of
Reiter’s original approach.
Our approach resides within Reiter’s default logic, while aiming at shifting the emphasis
from global, extension-based concepts to local, proof-oriented ones (whenever possible).
For this purpose, we develop various techniques and instruments that draw on an analysis of
interactions between default rules, manifested by their blocking behavior. While the basic
intuition behind “blockage” is related to argumentation semantics [5,19], our resulting
instruments and their applications have clearly taken a more profound—since default logic
specific—avenue of research. 1 The work closest to ours in the domain of default logic has
been done in [28] and [37], where the notion of conflict is treated.
The first application of our concepts deals with the existence-of-extensions problem.
Interestingly, semi-monotonicity implies the existence of extensions, so that all of the
above cited descendants of default logic guarantee extensions. Intuitively, this is due to the
fact that “local constructibility” allows us to incrementally construct extensions without
ever reconsidering any previous steps. The significance of the existence-of-extensions
problem has already led to several approaches, identifying subclasses of default theories
always possessing extensions in Reiter’s default logic. Among them, we find normal [40],
ordered [21], even 2 [39], and strongly stratified [10] default theories. An algorithmic
account of the existence-of-extensions problem is proposed in [48]. We show in Section 4.4
that our conception around the block graph provides us with a range of criteria going
beyond most of these proposals. The other advantage of our approach is its syntax-
independence, which is absent in all of the previous approaches. To be fair, however,
we note that our investment in constructing the block graph is also greater than that of
the aforecited approaches. Lastly, we mention that concepts like even and odd cycles
were also investigated in logic programming and truth-maintenance systems, which can
be interpreted as restricted fragments of default logic.
The second application of our concepts results in a series of alternative characterizations
of extensions that avoid the usual fixed-point condition. The first such non-fixed point
characterizations was obtained by Etherington in [20] when defining a semantics for
default logic. This was accomplished by imposing a strict partial order on the classes of
models of the initial set of facts, whose maximum elements are put in correspondence with
1 We come back to these approaches in Section 3.5, 4.4, and 5.4, respectively.
2 In the sequel, we use ps-even for referring to the notion of evenness proposed by Papadimitriou and Sideri
in [39].
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the extensions of the underlying theory. Alternative syntactic—yet fixed-point-based—
characterizations were proposed in [23,35,43,47]: A context-sensitive operator in the
tradition of logic programming is used in [35]; extensions (of several default logics) are
defined in terms of basic properties, like groundedness, regularity, etc. (see Section 2)
in [23]; characterizations aiming at tableau-based implementations are developed in [43,
47]. An operational specification based on so-called processes is given in [1]. These
processes amount to branches in the trees corresponding to the strict partial orders of
Etherington-style semantics [20]; therefore they also avoid a fixed-point condition. As with
Etherington’s semantics, the verification of consistency necessitates maximal sequences
of rules. The principal difference between all of these approaches and ours rests on the
necessity of exhaustive consistency checks. In our approach the block graph delineates the
set of default rules that must be inspected for consistency checking. Also, our avoidance
of fixed-point conditions is different from that employed by Etherington and followers.
While ours is accomplished by appeal to blocking relations, their approach relies on a
post-filtering condition, verifying valid constructions posteriorly [20].
The final application of our concepts results in formal characterizations of default proofs.
Although this question is closely related to the extension-membership problem, it has
so far been neglected in the literature. This is probably due to the fact that up to now
default proofs were regarded as being extension-dependent. The extension-membership
problem is therefore usually approached by resorting to the following loop: Generate an
extension, test if a formula in question is its member. If so, stop. Otherwise, repeat the
loop. This procedure can be implemented by any of the extension-construction procedures
known from the literature, e.g., [12,26,38,47]. In fact, Niemelä improves this approach
in [38] by providing an extension-construction procedure that allows to focus on extensions
containing an initial query. We note that all of these approaches are primarily interested
in the construction of extensions; the extension-membership problem is only addressed
indirectly. Proof-theoretic investigations of Reiter’s default logic were done in [3,4] on
the basis of natural deduction and sequent calculi. In these calculi, however, consistency
checking is also addressed in an exhaustive way by means of so-called “anti-calculi”.
Extension-dependency and thus the need for exhaustive considerations vanish in the
presence of semi-monotonicity. This was already exploited by Reiter in [40] for developing
a query-answering procedure for normal default theories. Other local procedures were
obtained in the aforecited variants of default logic. A local proof procedure for constrained
default logic was given in [44]. In [13], the same task is addressed for Łukaszewicz’
variant. Both approaches are local in the sense that they allow for deciding whether a
set of default rules forms a default proof by looking at the constituent rules only. These
approaches are thus centered around the concept of a default proof, which is missing in
the former extension-oriented approaches. The extension-independent characterization of
default proofs in Reiter’s default logic is thus one of our major concerns.
2. Background
We start by completing our initial introduction to Reiter’s default logic. A default rule
α :β
γ
is called normal if β is equivalent to γ ; it is called semi-normal if β implies γ . We
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sometimes denote the prerequisite α of a default rule δ by Prereq(δ), its justification β
by Justif (δ) and its consequent γ by Conseq(δ). 3 A set of default rules D and a set of
formulas W form a default theory 4 ∆ = (D,W), that may induce one, multiple or even
no extensions in the following way [40].
Definition 2.1. Let (D,W) be a default theory. For any set of formulas S, let Γ (S) be the
smallest set of formulas S′ such that
(1) W ⊆ S′,
(2) Th(S′)= S′,
(3) for any α :β
γ
∈D, if α ∈ S′ and ¬β /∈ S then γ ∈ S′.
A set of formulas E is an extension of (D,W) if Γ (E)=E.
Observe that E is a fixed-point of Γ . Any such extension represents a possible set
of beliefs about the world. For example, default theory (1) has two extensions: E1 =
Th(W ∪ {b,w,¬f }) and E2 = Th(W ∪ {b,w,f }), while theory (D ∪ { :x¬x },W) (where
D and W are taken as in (1)) has no extension.
We call a default theory coherent if it has some extension.
For simplicity, we assume for the rest of the paper that default theories (D,W) comprise
finite sets only. Additionally, we assume that for each default rule δ in D, we have that
W ∪ Justif (δ) is consistent. This can be done without loss of generality because we can
clearly eliminate all rules δ′ from D for which W ∪ Justif (δ′) is inconsistent without
altering the set of extensions.
For a set of formulas S and a set of defaults D, define the set of generating default
rules [40] as
GD(D,S)= {δ ∈D | S |= Prereq(δ) and S 6|= ¬Justif (δ)}. (2)
By taking δf , δw, δb, δ¬f to denote the default rules in (1), we see that the two extensions
of (1) are generated by GD(D,E1) = {δw, δb, δ¬f } and GD(D,E2) = {δf , δw, δb},
respectively.
Define a set of default rules D as grounded in a set of formulas S [46] iff there exists an
enumeration 〈δi〉i∈I of D such that for all i ∈ I we have that
S ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) |= Prereq(δi). (3)
Note that GD(D,E) is grounded in W whenever E forms an extension of default theory
(D,W). Conversely, the set E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E))) forms an extension of
(D,W) if GD(D,E) is grounded in W .
Define a set of default rules D as weakly regular with respect to a set of formulas S [23,
28] iff for each δ ∈D we have that
S ∪Conseq(D) 6|= ¬Justif (δ). (4)
Clearly, GD(D,E) is weakly regular with respect to W whenever E is an extension of
some theory (D,W).
3 This notation generalizes to sets of default rules in the obvious way, e.g., Prereq(D)= {Prereq(δ) | δ ∈D}.
4 If clear from the context, we sometimes refer to (D,W) as ∆ and vice versa.
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As shown in [43], maximal sets D′ ⊆ D of grounded and weakly regular default rules
induce extensions of (D,W) in Łukaszewicz’ variant of default logic [34]. That is, for
each such D′, Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)) forms a, say, Łukaszewicz extension. So, in contrast
to what we have observed on Theory (1) for Reiter’s default logic, Th(W ∪ {b,w,¬f })
and Th(W ∪ {b,w,f }) do actually provide valid Łukaszewicz extensions of default theory
(D ∪ { :x¬x },W), where D and W are taken as in (1). This works because Łukaszewicz’
variant enjoys the property of semi-monotonicity:
For any sets of default rules D′ ⊆D, we have that if E′ is an extension of (D′,W)
then there is an extension E of (D,W) where E′ ⊆E.
If a theory (D,W) enjoys this property, we can decide the extension-membership problem
for some formula ϕ by forming such a set E′ with ϕ ∈ E′. Then, semi-monotonicity tells
us that there is an extension E of (D,W) with E′ ⊆ E. For forming a default proof for
ϕ in Łukaszewicz’ variant, it is thus sufficient to construct a grounded and weakly regular
set of default rules P ⊆D with W ∪Conseq(P ) |= ϕ, while discarding all default rules in
D \ P . 5
Similar constructions are impossible in Reiter’s default logic, due to the aforementioned
reasons. On the other hand, we argue that there is no need for always inspecting all rules in
D \ P . But then the question arises how to tell which rules must be considered and which
rules can be ignored. An answer to this question is provided in the next section.
3. Representing interactions by block graphs
This section introduces the fundamental concepts on which we rely for analyzing
possible interactions among default rules. We express these interactions through blocking
relations that tell us which rules may block a rule in question. This information is
then condensed in block graphs by abstracting from particular blocking situations, while
keeping the essential interaction patterns between default rules. In the subsequent sections,
we show how these instruments can be used for turning extension-based concepts into
proof-oriented ones.
3.1. Blocking sets
Our approach is founded on the concept of blocking sets. Given a default theory
(D,W) and a default rule δ ∈ D, intuitively, a blocking set for δ is a set of default rules
B ⊆ D whose joint application denies the application of δ. Such a blocking set provides
a candidate for disabling the putatively applicable default rule δ. For this purpose, it is
actually sufficient to refute a rule’s justification, while ignoring its prerequisite. An existing
derivation of a prerequisite can only be counterbalanced by refuting the justification of one
of its default rules.
In order to become effective a blocking set must be included in the set of generating
default rules of an encompassing extension. That is, it must be grounded and the respective
5 We elaborate more upon the role of Łukaszewicz’ variant as a “lower bound” for Reiter’s default logic in [32].
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justifications must be consistent with the extension. In fact, groundedness can be effectively
verified by looking at the candidate set only, while consistency is context-dependent since
it refers to a final extension. Our aim is however to capture blockage as an intrinsic feature
of default theories rather than their resulting extensions. Moreover, we are often interested
in showing that a critical blocking set does not apply, which rules out an extension-based
characterization.
This leads us to the following definition of blocking sets.
Definition 3.1. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory. For δ ∈D and B ⊆D, we define
(1) B as a basic blocking set for δ, written B 7→∆ δ, iff
BS1 W ∪Conseq(B) |= ¬Justif (δ) and
BS2 B is grounded in W .
(2) B is an essential blocking set of δ, written B •7→∆ δ, iff B 7→∆ δ and
BS3 (B \ {δ′}) 67→∆ δ′′ for every δ′ ∈B and every δ′′ ∈B ∪ {δ}.
We define B∆(δ)= {B | B •7→∆ δ} as the set of all essential blocking sets of δ.
Observe that this definition treats default rules as monotonic inference rules. A blocking
set for a rule δ amounts to a proof of ¬Justif (δ) in a standard logical system augmented
by inference rules obtained from D by ignoring the default rules’ justifications. Such
systems are studied in [35]. Note that the consequents of a blocking set are not required
to be consistent. This is needed, for instance, to detect groups of default rules whose joint
application blocks any other default, like { :a
c
, :b¬c }. Finally, note that for all δ ∈D we have∅ 67→∆ δ because we require that W ∪ Justif (δ) is consistent.
For illustration, consider the following example.
∆=
({ : a
a
,
: ¬a
b
,
a ∧ b : x
c
,
: ¬c
d
}
,∅
)
. (5)
Among the basic blocking sets, we have{ : a
a
}
7→∆ : ¬a
b
and
{ : a
a
,
: ¬a
b
,
a ∧ b : x
c
}
7→∆ : ¬c
d
. (6)
In addition, all grounded supersets of { :¬a
b
} and { :a
a
, :¬a
b
, a∧b :x
c
} are basic blocking
sets for :¬a
b
and :¬c
d
, respectively. All these redundant supersets violate BS3, so that
none of them is an essential blocking set. Moreover, the second basic blocking set
in (6) is superfluous since it may never appear in an extension. To see this, observe that
{ :a
a
, :¬a
b
, a∧b :x
c
} contains a blocking set for one of its constituent rules, given by the first
blocking set in (6). In fact, such situations are also addressed by BS3. For instance, taking
δ′ = a∧b :x
c
and δ′′ = :¬a
b
in BS3 shows that { :a
a
, :¬a
b
, a∧b :x
c
} is no essential blocking set.
Hence, the above theory has only a single essential blocking set:{ : a
a
}
•7→∆ : ¬a
b
.
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We see that although BS1 and BS2 capture the basic characteristics of blocking sets, not
all such sets are needed for blocking a given rule. This is addressed in the second part of
Definition 3.1. In fact, BS3 furnishes a concise specification imposing, first, that essential
blocking sets are (set inclusion) minimal among all blocking sets of a rule and, second, that
essential blocking sets do not contain blocking sets for their constituent rules. We have the
following result.
Theorem 3.1. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let δ ∈D and B ⊆D.
We have that B •7→∆ δ iff the following conditions hold.
(1) B 7→∆ δ,
(2) B ′ 7→∆ δ for no B ′ ⊂ B , and
(3) B ′ 7→∆ δ′ for no B ′ ⊂ B and no δ′ ∈ B .
Condition (2) captures minimality, while condition (3) ensures a non-inclusion property.
Note that the latter does not apply to entire blocking sets, where B ′ = B , since their set of
consequents may be contradictory, as in { :a
c
, :b¬c }.
The fact that BS3 only eliminates superfluous blocking sets is guaranteed by the
following result.
Theorem 3.2. Let E be an extension of default theory ∆= (D,W) and let δ ∈D.
Then the following are equivalent:
(1) E |= ¬Justif (δ),
(2) there is some B ⊆D with B 7→∆ δ such that B ⊆GD(D,E),
(3) there is some B ⊆D with B •7→∆ δ such that B ⊆GD(D,E),
(4) there is some B ∈ B∆(δ) such that B ⊆GD(D,E).
This theorem shows that the existence of blocking sets provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for refuting a default rule’s justification according to the intuitions given in the
introductory section. It also demonstrates that the blocking sets retained in B∆(δ) have
the same effectiveness as their basic counterparts. Finally, it provides first evidence of
how extension-oriented notions can be expressed through blockage-based concepts. This is
illustrated by the fact that condition B∆(δ)= ∅ is sufficient for the consistency of Justif (δ)
with all extensions of ∆.
For further illustration, consider Theory (1) along with its blocking sets given in (7)–
(10):
B∆(δf )=
{{δ¬f }}, (7)
B∆(δw)= ∅, (8)
B∆(δb)= ∅, (9)
B∆(δ¬f )=
{{δb, δf }}. (10)
For example, {δ¬f } is the only blocking set for δf ; it comprises a possible refutation of abb,
the justification of δf . In general, a single default rule may have multiple blocking sets. For
example, adding :u
v∧¬v to theory (1) augments each set B∆(δi) by { :uv∧¬v }. The addition of:x
¬x to (1) leaves blocking sets (7)–(10) unaffected and yields B∆( :x¬x )= {{ :x¬x }}, reflecting
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self blockage. Observe that condition BS3 allows us to discard blocking sets that block
their own constituent rules. For instance, {δf , δb, δ¬f } is a putative blocking set of δw , but
it is ruled out by BS3 since it contains both δf and one of its blocking sets, {δ¬f }.
Let us now look at further properties of the blocking sets kept in B∆(δ). In fact, they
allow us to capture the conceptualization of consistency found in Reiter’s default logic
without any appeal to an encompassing extension, as shown next.
Theorem 3.3. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let D′ ⊆D be grounded in W .
We have that D′ is weakly regular with respect to W iff we have for each δ′ ∈ D′ and
each B ⊆D′ that B /∈ B∆(δ′).
Seen as a mapping from default theories ∆ = (D,W) to sets of sets of default rules
B∆(δ) (taking δ as a parameter), we observe that λx.Bx(δ) is monotone with respect to the
addition of default rules to D.
Theorem 3.4. Let ∆= (D,W) and ∆′ = (D′,W) be default theories with D ⊆D′.
For δ ∈D, we have that
(1) B ∈ B∆(δ) implies B ∈ B∆′(δ) and
(2) B ∈ B∆′(δ) and B ⊆D imply B ∈ B∆(δ).
This result implies that blocking sets can be constructed in an incremental fashion (cf.
Corollary 3.9). Note that λx.Bx(δ) is not monotone with respect to W , since, for instance,
adding a default rule’s consequent to W eliminates this default from all blocking sets that
contained it previously.
Let us now give some results establishing upper bounds for computational complexity.
The following result for basic blocking sets draws on a similar result obtained in [45].
Theorem 3.5. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let δ ∈D and B ⊆D.
Deciding whether B 7→∆ δ holds is in co-NP.
For establishing essential blocking sets, we may thus test for a given set B and a given
δ whether B ∈ B∆(δ) holds with a polynomial number of calls to an NP-oracle. This gives
the following result for determining whether there exists an essential blocking set for a
given rule.
Theorem 3.6. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let δ, δ′ ∈D.
Deciding whether there exists an essential blocking set B ∈ B∆(δ) such that δ′ ∈ B is
in 6P2 .
As regards space complexity, we note that in the worst case, a theory with n rules may
comprise O(2n) blocking sets. This is arguably an artifact of the problem in general rather
than the specific approach at hand—there may simply be an exponential number of ways in
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which a set of defaults conflict. Consider for example the class of default theories discussed
in [15], where we have
α : βi,1
βi,1
for i ∈ {1,2},
βi,j : βi′,j+1
βi′,j+1
for i, i ′ ∈ {1,2} and 16 j < n, and
βi,n : γ
γ
for i ∈ {1,2}.
For a given n there are clearly 2n “inferential paths” between α and γ . Given α, a rule like
:¬γ
ω
is faced with O(2n) blocking sets. While this characterizes the worst case, we expect
the number of blocking sets to be more manageable on average. For example, in an inheri-
tance hierarchy where a different “exception” type accounts for each level in the hierarchy,
we would have a set of blocking sets that is linear in the size of the hierarchy. See [32] for
detailed case-studies. On the other hand, the number of blocking sets is not related to the
number of extensions of a given theory. To see this, observe that the default rules
: ai
¬ci ,
: ci
¬ai for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
induce 2n extensions but only 2n blocking sets. That is, although we encounter an expo-
nential number of extensions, we have only a linear number of blocking sets. The last two
examples show that blockage- and extension-oriented approaches may work quite orthog-
onal to each other.
Finally, we show that blocking sets are independent from the representation of the
underlying default theory. For this purpose, we define syntactically equivalent default
theories as follows.
Definition 3.2. Let ∆= (D,W) and ∆′ = (D′,W ′) be two default theories.
We define ∆ and ∆′ to be syntactically equivalent if the following conditions hold.
(1) Th(W)= Th(W ′) and
(2) there is a bijective mapping f :D→D′ such that for each δ ∈D, we have
W |= Prereq(δ)≡ Prereq(f (δ)),
W |= Justif (δ)≡ Justif (f (δ)),
W |=Conseq(δ)≡ Conseq(f (δ)).
Observe that equivalence is actually defined modulo the set of premisesW .
We generalize mapping f to sets and sets of sets of default rules by putting f (B) =
{f (δ) | δ ∈ B} for B ⊆ D and f (B) = {f (B) | B ∈ B} for B ⊆ 2D . Then, we have
the following result showing that blocking sets are independent of the syntactical
representation of the underlying default theory.
Theorem 3.7. Let ∆ and ∆′ be syntactically equivalent default theory s and f :D→D′
some associated bijective mapping.
We have for each δ ∈D that f (B∆(δ))= B∆′(f (δ)).
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Two default theories are extension equivalent, if they have exactly the same extensions.
Clearly, syntactic equivalence implies extension equivalence but not vice versa [35].
3.2. Block graph
Given the concept of blocking sets, we are ready to define our salient instrument: The
block graph of a default theory.
Definition 3.3. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory.
The block graph Γ∆ = (V∆,A∆) of∆ is a directed graph with vertices V∆ =D and arcs
A∆ =
{
(δ′, δ) | δ′ ∈ B for some B ∈ B∆(δ)
}
.
The block graph is an extract of the essential blocking information comprised in all
blocking sets. This is done by abstracting from the membership of default rules in specific
blocking sets. That is, there is an arc (δ′, δ) between default rules δ′ and δ in the block
graph iff δ′ belongs to some blocking set for δ.
For default theory (1), we obtain the block graph given in Fig. 1; it has arcs (δ¬f , δf ),
(δf , δ¬f ) and (δb, δ¬f ).
We observe that the size of the block graph is always quadratic in the number of default
rules, although there may be an exponential number of blocking sets in the worst case.
The computational complexity associated with block graphs is directly related to that of
blocking sets, as shown in the next result.
Theorem 3.8. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory and let G = (D,A) be a directed
graph.
The problem of deciding whether G= Γ∆ is in 6P2 .
In view of the possibly exponential number of blocking sets, it is important to observe
that we neither have to keep nor to recompute blocking sets during the construction of
block graphs. This is expressed by the following corollary to the first part of Theorem 3.4.
Corollary 3.9. Let ∆= (D,W) and ∆′ = (D′,W) be default theories with D ⊆D′. Let
Γ∆ = (V∆,A∆) and Γ∆′ = (V∆′,A∆′) be the block graphs of ∆ and ∆′.
For δ, δ′ ∈D, we have that (δ, δ′) ∈A∆ implies (δ, δ′) ∈A∆′ .
Fig. 1. Block graph of default theory (1).
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Observe that the second part of Theorem 3.4 is inapplicable, since it refers to blocking
sets whose entity has disappeared in the block graph. To see this, consider a theory∆′ with
rules :a
a
,
a :b
b
,
:¬b
c
and no facts. Assume ∆ is obtained from ∆′ by deleting :a
a
. Then, we
have { :a
a
, a :b
b
} 7→∆′ :¬bc while { a :bb } 67→∆ :¬bc .
Another property carrying over from blocking sets to block graphs is that of syntax
independence.
Corollary 3.10. Let ∆ = (D,W) and ∆′ = (D′,W ′) be syntactically equivalent default
theories with block graphs Γ∆ = (V∆,A∆) and Γ∆′ = (V∆′,A∆′). Let f :D→D′ be some
associated bijective mapping.
We have for all δ, δ ∈D that (δ, δ′) ∈A∆ iff (f (δ), f (δ′)) ∈A∆′ .
Although a block graph gives up full blocking information in return for better
space complexity, it remains a powerful instrument for the purposes elaborated upon in
Sections 4–6. This is due to the fact that the block graph delineates the set of rules that
comprise putative inconsistencies. For instance, this allows us to limit our attention to such
rules when checking consistency. The next section draws on this for providing a conceptual
alternative to such consistency checks.
3.3. Supporting sets
From the perspective of blocking sets, a consistency check must guarantee that all
blocking sets of a rule in focus are inapplicable. This leads us to the concept of supporting
sets, which are intuitively simply blocking sets for blocking sets.
We first extend the notion of blocking sets to sets of rules: For a default theory
∆ = (D,W) and sets B,B ′ ⊆ D, we call B ′ a blocking set for B , written B ′ •7→∆ B , if
there is some default rule δ ∈ B such that B ′ •7→∆ δ, or equivalently B ′ ∈ B∆(δ). Note that
B
•67→ ∅ for each B ⊆D.
With this, we may define the concept of supporting sets as follows.
Definition 3.4. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory. For δ ∈D, we define the set S∆(δ) of
all supporting sets for δ as
S∆(δ)=
{
B ′1 ∪ · · · ∪B ′n | B ′i ⊆D such that B ′i •7→∆ Bi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and B∆(δ)= {B1, . . . ,Bn}
}
provided B∆(δ) 6= ∅. Otherwise, we define it as S∆(δ)= {∅}.
Observe that S∆(δ) = ∅ whenever B∆(δ′) = ∅ for all δ′ in some Bi ∈ B∆(δ), because
then for Bi there is no set of default rules B ′i such that B ′i
•7→∆ Bi , that is, B ′1 ∪ · · · ∪B ′n is
undefined.
The purpose of supporting sets is to rule out blocking sets as subsets of the generating
default rules. Once a supporting set for δ has been applied (i.e., once it is a subset of the
generating default rules), δ itself can be applied safely. Observe, however, that supporting
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sets may be inapplicable, as in the case of :x¬x , which forms both its own blocking and its
own supporting set. The supporting sets in theory (1) are given in (11)–(14):
S∆(δf )=
{{δb, δf }}, (11)
S∆(δw)= {∅}, (12)
S∆(δb)= {∅}, (13)
S∆(δ¬f )=
{{δ¬f }}. (14)
Consider the supporting set for δf in (11). We have to find one blocking set for each
blocking set in B∆(δf ) = {{δ¬f }}. In this easy case, we have to find some blocking set
for δ¬f , yielding {δb, δf }. Here, {δb, δf } is the only supporting set for δf . Similarly, for
δ¬f , we have to find a blocking set B ′ for {δb, δf } (see (10)). That is, we must have either
B ′ ∈ B∆(δb) or B ′ ∈ B∆(δf ). Because B∆(δb) is empty, we get {δ¬f } ∈ B∆(δf ) as the
only supporting set for δ¬f . The occurrence of δ¬f in its supporting set is due to the fact
that there is a direct conflict between δ¬f and its blocking set. This says that δ¬f is safely
applicable on its own. In general this need not be the case. For example, in default theory
({ :b
a
, : c¬b ,
:d
¬c , },∅) the last rule forms the single supporting set for the first one.
Since blocking sets are context-independent they represent merely candidate proofs for
refuting a default rule’s justification. That is, for a default rule there may be some extension
containing such a blocking set that inhibits the application of the rule. Thus, given only a
rule and one of its blocking sets, we cannot decide whether the rule applies without the
final extension. The situation is different with supporting sets. Clearly, supporting sets are
also context-independent. But unlike blocking sets, they are supposed to apply in the same
extension as their supported rule. This can be made precise as follows.
Theorem 3.11. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory. For every δ ∈D and every extension
E of ∆, we have that if E |= Prereq(δ) and S ⊆ GD(D,E) for some S ∈ S∆(δ), then
δ ∈GD(D,E).
In fact, the joint application of a rule and one of its supporting sets can only be denied by
an independent self-blocking part of the theory that destroys an encompassing extension.
Thus, given a rule and one of its supporting sets, we can decide whether the rule (and its
supporting set) applies whenever we can rule out sources of incoherence. This is one of the
key ideas developed in Section 5 and 6.
3.4. Detecting and reconstructing blocking sets
Although the information gathered in the block graph is often sufficient for addressing
problems like the existence-of-extension problem, the detection and reconstruction of
blocking sets remain important issues for deciding the applicability of default rules.
For expressing how a block graph Γ∆ may facilitate addressing these issues, we let
γ−1(δ) denote the set of predecessors of δ in Γ∆ and let γ−2(δ) denote the set of
predecessors of the nodes in γ−1(δ). For D′ ⊆ D, define γ−1(D′) = {δ ∈ γ−1(δ′) | δ′ ∈
D′} and γ−2(D′)= {δ ∈ γ−2(δ′) | δ′ ∈D′}.
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The specific blocking and supporting sets are delineated by the block graph in the
following way.
Theorem 3.12. Let ∆= (D,W) be default theory and let Γ∆ be its block graph.
We have for all default rules δ ∈D that
(1) B ⊆ γ−1(δ) for all B ∈ B∆(δ), and
(2) S ⊆ γ−2(δ) for all S ∈ S∆(δ).
In what follows, we give some sufficient, block-graph-based conditions for detecting
blocking and supporting sets. Recall from Theorem 3.2 that the absence of blocking sets
for a rule establishes the consistency of its justification. For illustration, consider the
predecessor sets obtained from the block graph in Fig. 1:
γ−1(δf )= {δ¬f }, γ−2(δf )= {δf , δb},
γ−1(δw)= ∅, γ−2(δw)= ∅,
γ−1(δb)= ∅, γ−2(δb)= ∅,
γ−1(δ¬f )= {δf , δb}, γ−2(δ¬f )= {δ¬f }.
(15)
Our succinct example illustrates already some simple criteria that can be directly obtained
from the block graph. First, whenever we have γ−1(δ) = ∅ a default rule δ is applicable
without consistency check. Second, whenever we have γ−2(δ) = {δ} a default rule δ can
support itself 6 inside an existing extension. This is therefore inapplicable to rules like :x¬x .
In fact, the following conditions are sufficient for the absence of blocking and the
presence of supporting sets, respectively, in a set of rules D′:
D′ ∩ γ−1(D′)= ∅, (16)
γ−2(D′)⊆D′, if for every δ′ ∈D′ and δ′′ ∈ γ−1(δ′), we have γ−1(δ′′) 6= ∅. (17)
The first condition tells us that D′ contains no blocking set for any of its members. The
second condition makes sure that all blocking sets of all members ofD′ are inhibited inD′
because all supporting sets are present. The condition in (17) excludes cases where rules
have blocking but no supporting sets.
More generally, we have the following sufficient criteria for the absence and presence,
respectively, of blocking sets for a default rule δ in a grounded set of rules D′. There is no
blocking set in D′ for δ, if
W ∪Conseq(D′ ∩ γ−1(δ)) 6|= ¬Justif (δ). (18)
On the other hand, there is some blocking set in D′ for δ, if
W ∪Conseq(D′ ∩ γ−1(δ)) |= ¬Justif (δ)
and provided that D′ ∩ γ−1(δ) is grounded.
Finally, let us consider the verification of weak regularity for a grounded setD′ of default
rules. According to Theorem 3.3, we must show that D′ contains no blocking sets for its
6 This is made precise in condition PTD2 in Definition 5.1.
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members. This is true if (18) holds for each δ ∈D′. However, given the underlying block
graph Γ∆ = (V∆,A∆), we may restrict our attention to rules δ that belong to the following
subset of D′:
C′ = {δ ∈D′ | (δ′, δ) ∈ ((D′ ×D′)∩A∆)}.
For illustration, consider D′ = {δw, δb, δ¬f } along with the block graph in Fig. 1. We get
C′ = {δ¬f } and D′ ∩ γ−1(δ¬f ) = {δb} for which (18) holds—while ignoring all rules in
D′ \C′ = {δw, δb}.
The last criteria illustrate the block graph’s role in delineating sets of “critical rules”.
In the worst case, we are faced with a complete block graph, from which no gain is to
be expected. Otherwise, it should be clear that the smaller the sets γ−1(δ) and γ−2(δ), the
larger the pay-off obtained by means of the block graph. This question is further elaborated
upon in [32], where coloring techniques are used to gather more information in block
graphs.
3.5. Related approaches
As mentioned in the introductory section, our approach shares some of its basic
intuitions with argumentation semantics. In the pioneering work of Dung in [19] an
argumentation framework is a pair (A,R) where A is a set of arguments and R ⊆ A×A
represents an “attack” relation between arguments. In this framework, a default theory can
be (informally) interpreted via arguments of the form (J,φ), where Justif (P )⊆ J for some
“default proof”P of φ (cf. Definition 6.1). And (J,φ) attacks (J ′, φ′) iff¬φ ∈ J ′. Observe
that this abstract setting gives an infinite set of arguments, amounting to all possible default
proofs drawable from an underlying default theory.
This framework in refined in [5] by considering assumption-based frameworks of form
(T ,A, ) where T andA are sets of formulas and is a mapping fromA in the underlying
language. A stands for a set of assumptions that can be used for extending a theory T ;
maps assumptions to their contrary. Among other nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms,
default logic has been shown to be an instance of this abstract framework. Given a theory
(D,W), default rules α :β
γ
∈ D are identified with monotonic inference rules of form
α,Mβ
γ
. Adding these rules to classical logic, gives an inference relation `D . Further, let
T =W and A= {Mβ | β ∈ Justif (D)}; the contrary Mβ of an assumption Mβ ∈A is ¬β .
Given an assumption set A′ ⊆ A and an assumption Mβ ∈ A, A′ is said to attack Mβ iff
W ∪A′ `D ¬β .
Despite their different objects of discourse, blocking sets can be associated with
redundancy-free attacks. In fact, we have that
• B 7→∆ δ implies that {Mβ | β ∈ Justif (B)} attacks MJustif (δ), as well as
• B •7→∆ δ implies that {Mβ | β ∈ Justif (B)} attacks MJustif (δ).
To see that the converse does not hold in either case, consider theory (5). We get
A = {Ma,M¬a,Mx,M¬c}. However, while A is an attack for M¬a and M¬c its
counterpart { :a
a
, :¬a
b
, a∧b :x
c
, :¬c
d
} is neither a basic nor an essential blocking set for any
of its members. One can show that there is a correspondence between the minimal basic
blocking sets of a rule δ and the minimal attacks of Justif (δ). Moreover, in analogy to the
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discussion after (6), we have that {Ma,M¬a,Mx} attacks Mc, which has no essential
blocking set as counterpart. This shows that attacks comprise much more redundancy than
blocking sets. To be fair, however, one should bear in mind that the concept of an attack
resides within an abstract framework, while our approach provides an infrastructure for
reasoning, being specific to default logic. We return to this approach in Section 5.4.
As regards other work specific to default logic, we mention that the works in [28]
and [37] treat the related notion of conflict dealing with minimal sets of default rules having
inconsistent consequents rather than proof skeletons menacing particular justifications, as
in our approach.
4. Existence of extensions
Determining whether a default theory has an extension is a fundamental problem in
default logic. This question is also pertinent to the extension-membership problem, since
reasonable conclusions must reside in an existing extension. In previous works, broad
subclasses of default theories always possessing extensions have been identified. Among
them we find normal [40], ordered [21], ps-even [39], 7 and strongly stratified [10] default
theories.
We address this problem by exploiting blocking relations among default rules by means
of the formal tools developed in the last section. This provides us with a range of criteria
on the coherence and incoherence of default theories.
4.1. Block-graph-based criteria
To begin with, we call a default theory (D,W) non-conflicting, if it has no blocking
sets, that is, if its block graph has no arcs; otherwise we call it conflicting. Non-
conflicting default theories have unique extensions and trivially allow for inferences
without consistency checks. 8
Theorem 4.1. Every non-conflicting default theory has a single extension.
For instance, default theory ({ :a
a
, :b
b
},∅) is non-conflicting, yielding a block graph with
no arcs. The same holds for theory (1), when eliminating either b :¬abb
f
or
p :¬abp
¬f .
More interestingly, we call a default theory well-ordered, if its block graph is acyclic.
Theorem 4.1 can be strengthened by the next result, showing that well-ordered default
theories have single extensions.
Theorem 4.2. Every well-ordered default theory has a single extension.
For instance, default theory ({ :a
a
, :b∧¬a
b
},∅) is well-ordered; its block graph contains a
single arc, indicating that the first rule may block the second one (but not vice versa).
7 We use ps-even for referring to the notion of evenness due to Papadimitriou and Sideri [39].
8 Observe that although non-conflicting default theories ignore justifications, they are still non-monotonic in
the sense that extensions may be invalidated after augmenting a non-conflicting theory.
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We call a default theory even, if its block graph contains cycles with even length only.
Our main result of this section states that even default theories always have extensions.
Theorem 4.3. Every even default theory has an extension.
For instance, default theory ({ :a∧¬b
a
, :b∧¬a
b
},∅) is even; its block graph contains two
arcs, indicating that the first rule may block the second one, and vice versa.
Evenness is also enjoyed by our initial default theory in (1), as can be easily verified by
means of its block graph in Fig. 1. Unlike this, default theory ({ :x¬x },∅) is not even, since
its block graph contains an odd cycle of length one.
The above criteria provide us with a strict hierarchy of default theories always possessing
extensions. The advantage of these criteria is that they are easily verified, once a block
graph has been computed. That is, they can be tested in polynomial time and they rely on a
simple data structure. Moreover, they apply to general default theories and they are syntax-
independent, unlike other approaches [21,39] that apply to semi-normal default theories
only and that give different results on equivalent yet syntactically different theories, as
detailed in Section 4.4.
4.2. A blocking-set-based criterion for deciding coherence
The last criteria were based on the abstraction from specific blocking sets furnished by
the block graph. Although this results in a much better space complexity, there is a price to
pay. The criteria fail to capture the entire class of coherent theories. In fact, we can decide
the existence-of-extension problem for arbitrary default theories, when considering the
underlying blocking sets instead of their block graph. This is to the best of our knowledge
the first complete characterization for this problem.
For this, define a directed graph on all blocking sets of a default theory as follows.
Definition 4.1. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory. The graph Ω∆ = (V Ω∆ ,AΩ∆) is a
directed graph with vertices VΩ∆ = {B ∈ B∆(δ) | δ ∈D} and arcs
AΩ∆ =
{
(B,B ′) | B •7→∆ B ′
}
.
The directed graphΩ∆ represents the complete blocking information of ∆.
Furthermore, we need the following definition.
Definition 4.2. Let G= (V ,A) be a directed graph and K ⊆ V an independent subset of
vertices. K is an inverse kernel of G iff for all nodes u ∈ V \K exists a v ∈K such that
(v,u) ∈A.
Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.4. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory.
We have that Ω∆ has an inverse kernel iff ∆ has an extension.
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In fact, we show in proof of Theorem 4.3 that every even theory ∆ induces an inverse
kernel in its graphΩ∆.
Moreover, there are non-even theories inducing such kernels. Let us illustrate this via
the example, used by Etherington in [20] to show that semi-normal default theories may
lack extensions:
∆=
({ : a ∧¬b
a
,
: b ∧¬c
b
,
: c ∧¬a
c
}
,∅
)
, (19)
for short δa, δb, δc, respectively. This theory has no extension. From sets B∆(δa) =
{{δb}}, B∆(δb) = {{δc}}, and B∆(δc) = {{δa}}, we get a block graph Γ∆ with arcs
(δc, δb), (δb, δa), (δa, δc) ∈ A∆ whose arcs form an odd cycle. Adding formula c→ b
to (19) yields actually a theory∆′ whose only extension contains c. The block graph of this
theory contains in addition to the odd cycle the arc (δc, δa). In fact, this arc counterbalances
the self-blocking behavior of the odd cycle. The last two situations cannot be distinguished
via the criteria of Section 4.1. Thus, none of them is able to indicate an extension in the
second case, since Γ∆′ has still an odd cycle. This is different from the criterion expressed
in Theorem 4.4 that indicates an extension in the second case. To see this, observe that {δc}
forms an inverse kernel of Ω∆′ .
4.3. Non-existence of extensions
Our exposition was so far dominated by tests guaranteeing the existence of extensions,
although tests for their non-existence are also of interest. To see this, reconsider
Theory (19). There, we observed how an odd cycle was counterbalanced by an arc from
outside the odd cycle. In fact, we can show that an odd cycle destroys all extensions
whenever there is no such arc (and no chords in the cycle).
Let us make this precise in the sequel. Given a cycle C in a directed graph, an arc
between two nodes of C is called a chord, if it does not belong to the arcs of C.
Definition 4.3. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory with block graph Γ∆ = (D,A∆).
We define a cycle C ⊆D in Γ∆ as harmful to ∆ iff
(1) C has no chords, and
(2) there is no δ ∈ (D \C) such that (δ, δ′) ∈A∆ for some δ′ ∈ C.
Now, we are ready to prove the following result on the non-existence of extensions.
Theorem 4.5. Let ∆= (D,W) be default theory and C ⊆D.
If C is a harmful odd cycle in Γ∆, then ∆ has no extension.
For illustration, consider the odd cycle in the block graph of Theory (19). This cycle
satisfies both conditions in Definition 4.3, indicating that (19) has no extension.
Although Theorem 4.5 does not furnish a complete characterization for default theories
without extensions, it provides nonetheless an easy, block-graph-based test that allows us
to shorten the gap towards those theories whose extensions are detectable by means of the
criteria given in Section 4.1.
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4.4. Related approaches to the existence-of-extension problem
Historically, normal default theories were the first class for which the existence of
extensions was demonstrated [40]. One may wonder why they have not played a special
role so far. The reason is that normal default rules are involved in the reasoning process
as any other rules. For instance, take a rule :b
c
and no facts; this gives an extension
containing c. But adding normal rule c :¬b¬b destroys this extension and leaves us with
an incoherent theory. This should illustrate that normal default rules deserve the same
attention as any other rule. In fact, neither our approach nor any of the following ones is
able to indicate—by its proper means 9 —the existence of extensions for normal default
theories.
Etherington’s ordered default theories
The pioneering work on the existence-of-extension problem was done by Etherington
in [20], although the problem was already discussed in [40]. Etherington’s approach applies
to semi-normal default theories in clausal form. The idea is to extract from such theories a
relation on literals. Intuitively, this relation was meant to capture the inferential dependency
among literals. Then, a semi-normal default theory was said to be ordered if the resulting
relation was irreflexive, that is, no literal depended on itself.
Ordered theories were then supposed to possess at least one extension. Unfortunately
this turned out to be wrong. To see this, consider default theory({ : c∧ b
c
,
c : ¬b
¬b
}
,∅
)
.
Although this semi-normal default theory is ordered according to [20, p. 86, Definition
and], it has no extension. This counterexample applies also to the improvements made
in [2].
We obtain from the previous theory a block graph having two arcs pointing from both
default rules to the first one. This graph has thus an odd cycle that renders the underlying
theory incoherent.
Papadimitriou and Sideri’s even default theories
Papadimitriou and Sideri generalized Etherington’s approach in [39]. Their approach
is also restricted to semi-normal default theories in conjunctive normal form. In analogy
to [20], a relation is extracted from these theories in order to capture the dependency among
literals. This relation is used to define a directed graph with nodes D. Papadimitriou and
Sideri show in [39] that any default theory, whose corresponding graph has only even
cycles, possesses an extension. For clarity, we refer to such theories as being ps-even.
Consider the theories({ : c
c
}
,∅
)
and
({ : c ∧ (c ∨¬c)
c
}
,∅
)
both of which have the same extension Th({c}). However, both theories yield a different
graph in the approach of Papadimitriou and Sideri. While the first one satisfies ps-evenness,
9 That is, without providing a priori a special case handling normal default rules, as done in [10].
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the second does not satisfy ps-evenness. This demonstrates that ps-evenness is syntax-
dependent.
Our approach yields for both theories the same block graph, having a single node and no
arcs. Both theories are thus recognized as being non-conflicting and as possessing a single
extension. This shows that there are even default theories that are not ps-even. Conversely,
we have the following result.
Theorem 4.6. Let ∆ be a semi-normal default theory in conjunctive normal form.
If ∆ is ps-even, then it is even.
We see that the block-graph-based criterion of evenness is more general than its
counterpart in the approach of Papadimitriou and Sideri:
(i) it is not restricted to a fragment of default logic,
(ii) it is syntax-independent, and
(iii) it is more expressive on the fragment dealt with by Papadimitriou and Sideri.
To be fair, however, we note that our investment in constructing the block graph is also
greater than that needed for constructing the graphs for ps-evenness.
We note that similar graphs and kernels are used in [17,18] to ensure existence of
extensions for the restricted class of propositional prerequisite-free conjunctive default
theories.
Cholewin´ski’s stratified default theories
Cholewin´ski adapts in [10] the notion of stratification, known from logic programming,
for default logic. He then proves that so-called strongly stratified default theories always
possess extensions. Intuitively, this criterion distinguishes default theories whose rules can
be ordered by means of a stratification function.
In addition to this ordering condition, however, stratification imposes a rather severe
restriction on the interplay between the premises W of a default theory and its default
rulesD: It requires that the languages of W and Conseq(D) are disjoint. For instance, this
prevents stratification techniques to recognize the existence of simple normal theories, like
({ :a
a
, :b
b
}, {¬a ∨¬b}).
As opposed to all aforementioned approaches, the definition of stratification provides a
particular account for normal default rules, having syntactically equivalent justifications
and consequents (see [10]). However, the approach fails to capture the existence of
extensions for semantically normal default theories, due to a lack of syntax independence.
To see this, consider theories({ : a
a
,
: b
b
}
,∅
)
and
({ : a ∧ (x ∨¬x)
a ∧ (y ∨¬y) ,
: b ∧ (y ∨¬y)
b ∧ (x ∨¬x)
}
,∅
)
,
both of which have the same extension Th({a, b}). As detailed in [32], the first default
theory is strongly stratified, which is not the case for the second one. This demonstrates that
stratification is syntax-dependent. Of course, this is rectifiable by replacing the underlying
concept of “syntactical equivalence” by “logical equivalence”; however, this means also
passing from a subproblem in P to one in NP.
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Our approach yields for both theories the same arcless block graph, indicating the
existence of a single extension. To be fair, we recall that the computation of the block
graph is probably beyond NP.
Bondarenko et al.’s order-consistent assumption-based frameworks
In [5], a minimality condition is imposed on attacks in order to define an attack
relationship graph for assumption-based frameworks. This graph is used to define stratified
and order-consistent assumption-based frameworks (see [5] for details). We have the
following result.
Theorem 4.7. Let (D,W) be a default theory and let 〈T ,A, 〉 be the corresponding
assumption-based framework.
(1) If 〈T ,A, 〉 is stratified according to [5], then (D,W) is well-ordered.
(2) If 〈T ,A, 〉 is order-consistent according to [5], then (D,W) is even.
To see that stratification and order-consistence are strictly weaker concepts than well-
orderedness and evenness, respectively, consider the following extension of theory (5)({ : a
a
,
: ¬a
b
,
a ∧ b : x
c
,
: ¬c
d
,
: ¬d
¬a
}
,∅
)
.
This theory is neither stratified nor order-consistent, whilst it is well-ordered and thus also
even. Let us explain this in terms of minimal basic blocking sets, since they correspond to
minimal attacks. We have{ : a
a
,
: ¬a
b
,
a ∧ b : x
c
}
7→∆ : ¬c
d
,
{ : ¬c
d
}
7→∆ : ¬d¬a and{ : ¬d
¬a
}
7→∆ : a
a
.
This induces an odd cycle between :¬c
d
,
:¬d
¬a , and
:a
a
in the corresponding attack
relationship graph. In contrast to this, the essential blocking sets of the above theory induce
an acyclic block graph, which allows us to establish the existence of a single extension.
5. Alternative characterizations of extensions
This section furnishes alternative characterizations of extensions by appeal to blocking
sets. It lays the formal foundations for our elaboration upon local, proof-oriented concepts
for default logic. To this end, we shift the emphasis from extensions to their underlying
sets of generating default rules. The application of a set of default rules depends on several
issues. Apart from groundedness, it involves protecting the constituent default rules against
blockage and assuring an encompassing extension. We start by giving a formal account of
the first issue, while the second one can be addressed by the criteria developed in the last
section.
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5.1. Protectedness
The concept of a set of default rules being “protected against blockage” can be made
precise as follows.
Definition 5.1. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory.
A set of default rules D′ ⊆D is protected in ∆ iff for each δ ∈D′ we have that
PTD1 B ⊆D′ for no B ∈ B∆(δ) and
PTD2 S ⊆D′ for some S ∈ S∆(δ).
In words, a set of defaults is protected if it contains no blocking set for any of its
defaults and if it contains some supporting set for each constituent default. For example,
D′ = {δb, δf } is protected in (1). A set like { :x¬x } cannot be protected. Although { :x¬x } is its
own supporting set, which establishes PTD2, it fails to satisfy PTD1.
We note that protectedness depends exclusively on the rules inD′ and those connected to
D′ in the block graph. In fact, PTD1 refers to rules inD′ only so that it remains unaffected
when increasing D \D′. It is therefore monotonic with respect to the addition of default
rules to D. Semantically, PTD1 is the blockage-oriented counterpart of weak regularity
(cf. Theorem 3.3). As opposed to the local character of PTD1, condition PTD2 controls
the interaction with rules external to D′. PTD2 guarantees that there are no blocking
sets outside of D′. The scope of this interaction is delineated by the pre-predecessors of
D′ in the block graph, among which we find the supporting sets needed for protecting
D′ against its blocking sets. In all, (grounded) protected sets can be regarded as fully
independent components for generating default rules. This important fact is made precise
in Theorem 5.3 below.
In fact, the generating default rules of an extension form themselves a protected set of
default rules.
Theorem 5.1. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let E be a set of formulas.
If E is an extension of ∆, then GD(D,E) is protected in ∆.
5.2. Characterizing extensions without fixed-points
By combining the notion of protectedness with a coherence condition, we obtain a series
of alternative characterizations of extensions, all of which are based on Theorem 5.3 below.
For expressing this result, we first need the following definition.
Definition 5.2. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and D′ ⊆D.
We define
∆|D′ as (D \ (D′ ∪D′ ), W ∪Conseq(D′)),
where D′ = {δ ∈D |W ∪Conseq(D′) |= ¬Justif (δ)}.
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The purpose of D′ is to eliminate defaults whose justification is inconsistent with the
facts of ∆|D′. Intuitively, the operation ∆|D′ results in a default theory, simulating the
application of the rule set D′ to theory ∆. This is made precise in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let E be a set of formulas. Further,
let D′ ⊆GD(D,E) be grounded in W .
We have that E is an extension of ∆ iff E is an extension of ∆|D′.
Using this concept, we can formulate the following major result.
Theorem 5.3. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let E be a set of formulas.
We have that E is an extension of ∆ iff
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)∪E′)
for some D′ ⊆D such that
(1) D′ is grounded in W ,
(2) D′ is protected in ∆, and
(3) ∆|D′ has extension E′.
The utility of this result stems from its decomposition of the definition of an extension
into the formation of grounded, protected sets D′ and a coherence condition. Notably, in
a coherent context, the application of such a set of rules is fully independent of the rest of
the theory. Observe also that verifying conditions (1) and (2) involves inspecting D′ and
predecessors of D′ in the block graph only (see Theorem 5.9 below). The treatment of the
remaining rules is (roughly) mapped onto an existence-of-extension problem.
Taking D′ in the “only-if” direction of the last theorem as the generating default rules
of E yields a non-conflicting default theory, as shown next.
Theorem 5.4. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory.
If E is an extension of ∆, then default theory ∆|GD(D,E) is non-conflicting.
That is, we get an arcless block graph Γ∆|GD(D,E) = (D \ (GD(D,E)∪GD(D,E) ),∅).
The “if” direction of Theorem 5.3 is of great significance, since it furnishes construction
principles for extensions, depending on the nature of the underlying default theory.
Trivially, the unique extension of a non-conflicting theory is induced by the greatest
grounded subset of default rules.
Theorem 5.5. Let ∆= (D,W) be a non-conflicting default theory and let E be a set of
formulas.
We have that E is an extension of ∆ iff
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′))
for the greatest set D′ ⊆D being grounded in W .
Technically, this result is obtained as a by-product in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
The more interesting case is the conflicting yet coherent one.
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Theorem 5.6. Let ∆= (D,W) be an even default theory and let E be a set of formulas.
We have that E is an extension of ∆ iff E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)) for some maximal
D′ ⊆D being grounded in W and protected in ∆.
That is, once the block graph indicates that a default theory is even its extensions are
induced by maximally grounded and protected sets of default rules. This definition does
not only avoid a global consistency check, as needed in traditional ones, but it moreover
gets rid of the usual fixed-point condition.
Even more surprisingly, this can also be achieved in the general case.
Theorem 5.7. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let E be a set of formulas.
We have that E is an extension of ∆ iff E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)) for some maximal
D′ ⊆D such that D′ is grounded in W , D′ is protected in ∆ and ∆|D′ is non-conflicting.
In contrast to even theories, we need in the general case an additional filter, stipulating
that the resulting set D′ induces an arcless block graph Γ∆|D′ . As a matter of fact, this is
needed for covering the entire set of default rules D. While D′ is conditioned by multiple
constraints, (D \D′) is taken care of through Γ∆|D′ . Thus, the rules in (D \D′) are not
necessarily (re)inspected due to the block graph.
We see that both Theorems 5.3 and 5.7 rely on block graph Γ∆|D′ . In fact, these block
graphs can be obtained from Γ∆ by arc deletion only, as shown next.
Theorem 5.8. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory such that Γ∆ = (D,A∆) contains no
self loops.
If D′ ⊆D is grounded in W and protected in ∆, then A∆|D′ ⊆A∆.
Thus new arcs can only appear in Γ∆|D′ in the presence of self-loops. 10
The obvious question is now: Where have the global consistency check along with its
underlying fixed-point construction gone? The answer is: They have been compiled away!
A fixed-point construction is usually needed for guessing the resulting extension. During
the reconstruction of such an extension, all default rules are then already applied relative to
the consistency requirements imposed by the final extension. In this way, it is impossible
that the application of a default rule δ is subsequently invalidated by applying another
default rule δ′, whose consequent contradicts the justification of δ. That is, checking
consistency against the pre-guessed extension makes it impossible to apply default rules
under wrong consistency assumptions. Now, the block graph makes such kind of guesses
obsolete, since it tells us which rules threaten the application of other rules. That is, when
considering δ for application, the block graph indicates whether it is threatened by δ′, and
if this is the case which defaults are candidates for supporting the application of δ (by
blocking δ′). Formally, this is accomplished by stipulating protectedness. In addition, we
must account in the general case for default rules menacing the overall extension. This is
10 This is due to condition BS3 in Definition 3.1, which relies on the elimination of single rules; such a rule may
constitute a self-loop.
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addressed by requiring that the theory simulating the application of the generating default
rules is non-conflicting (or equivalently, that its block graph has no arcs anymore).
Consider our running example (1). The first extension E1 is generated by GD(D,E1)=
{δw, δb, δ¬f }. Clearly, GD(D,E1) is grounded; its protectedness is established by the
sufficient conditions in (16) and (17). For maximality, we observe that the addition of
δf would violate PTD1. Finally, we note that ∆|GD(D,E1) leaves us with an empty set
of rules, giving an empty block graph.
For a complement, consider the theory ∆′ obtained by adding :x¬x to (1). The set
GD(D,E1) ∪ { :x¬x } violates PTD1, so that we consider once more GD(D,E1), whose
grounded- and protectedness are established as above. Now, however, ∆′|GD(D,E1)
yields a block graph, whose single arc is a loop at node :x¬x . Since all further subsets of
GD(D,E1) bear even richer block graphs,∆′ has no extension.
5.3. Restricted semi-monotonicity
An important question is which rules in D must actually be inspected for deciding
whether D′ is a subset of the set of generating default rules of some extension. Recall
that this question has a trivial answer in semi-monotonic default logics: It is justD′ and no
other rules. In Reiter’s default logic, the answer can be read off the block graph: It is D′
along with its reachable predecessors.
By letting γ ?(D′) denote the set of all reachable predecessors 11 of rules fromD′ in Γ∆,
we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5.9 (Restricted semi-monotonicity). Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let
D′ ⊆D be a set of defaults.
If (γ ?(D′),W) has an extension E? and ∆|GD(γ ?(D′),E?) is coherent, then ∆ has an
extension E with E? ⊆E.
This result makes precise the block graph’s role for limiting the search space by
delineating the set of default rules that must be inspected for validating the application
of a set of default rules.
As mentioned in the introductory section, semi-monotonicity was already isolated by
Reiter in [40], where he showed that it is only satisfied by normal default theories. This
has led in the following years to the development of various alternative default logics, all
of which enjoy semi-monotonicity in full generality. The result given in Theorem 5.9 is—
to the best of our knowledge—the first result on semi-monotonicity capturing non-normal
default theories in Reiter’s default logic.
5.4. Related approaches for characterizing extensions
As mentioned above, the first non-fixed-point characterization of extensions was
given in [20]. A rough syntactic characterization of Etherington’s semantics amounts to
constructing maximal sequences 〈δi〉i∈I of default rules that are grounded and that satisfy
11 See Appendix A for a formal definition.
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W ∪Conseq({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) 6|= ¬Justif (δi) for all i ∈ I. (20)
Such a sequence is called stable if it is weakly regular. Stable sequences correspond
to generating default rules of extensions and vice versa [20]. Condition (20) gives an
approximation of weak regularity, which is then verified a posteriori.
Another interesting characterization of extension is given in [43]: E is an extension of
(D,W) iff there is a grounded subset D′ ⊆D such that E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)) and for
all δ ∈D we have
(1) If δ ∈D′ then Prereq(δ) ∈E and ¬Justif (δ) /∈E,
(2) If δ /∈D′ then Prereq(δ) /∈E or ¬Justif (δ) ∈E.
Unlike above, this characterization makes explicit reference to the rules in D \D′. This
reference is usually dealt with implicitly by appropriate maximality conditions. In fact,
any valid D′ is a maximal grounded set satisfying condition (1).
Let us now return to the argumentation frameworks discussed in Section 3.5. Dung
gives in [19] a correspondence between extensions and his stable sets, defined as: S =
{A | A is not attacked by S}. This concept is refined in assumption-based frameworks [5],
where stable sets are defined as sets of assumptions S satisfying the following conditions:
(1) S does not attack itself, and
(2) S attacks each assumption φ /∈ S.
Equivalently, given an assumption based framework (T ,A, ) for some (D,W), a set S is
stable iff
S = {Mβ | β ∈ Justif (D) and W ∪ S 6`D ¬β}= {A |A is not attacked by S}. (21)
In [5], extensions are then put in correspondence with sets of form Th(W ∪ S). This gives
a characterization of extensions in terms of sets of justifications, as opposed to sets of
generating default rules. Condition (1) enforces weak regularity. Similar to Risch’s second
condition, condition (2) stipulates that any rule (or justification) not contributing to the
stable set cannot be applied. As above, this induces maximal sets satisfying condition (1).
Our family of characterizations differs in several respects from those listed above. First,
our basic characterization in Theorem 5.3 does not rely on maximal sets of rules; it is
applicable to arbitrary subsets D′ of D. Second, it deals with rules in D \D′ by appeal
to coherence, which can be addressed in several ways. For instance, by using the block
graph, it allows us to avoid the common fixed-point characterization of extensions (cf.
Theorem 5.7). Third, we use supporting sets for protecting D′ instead of (meta)conditions
forbidding blocking sets outside of D′.
Among the computationally motivated characterizations of extensions, Niemelä de-
scribes in [38] sophisticated conflict-resolution techniques for an extension-construction
procedure. Interestingly, as assumption-based frameworks, it relies on characterizing ex-
tensions by sets of justifications, called full sets. Full sets contain those justifications that
are consistent with the set, obtained by closing the initial set of facts under classical infer-
ences and those default rules (used as monotonic inference rules) whose justifications be-
long to the full set. By definition, this is equivalent to the notion of stable sets given in (21).
Computationally, full sets are determined by techniques borrowed from the Davis–Putnam
Procedure [14]. In contrast to this, Marek et al. advocate in [11] stratification techniques as
the primary tool of their extension-construction procedure.
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Finally, let us briefly return to argumentation frameworks in order to investigate the
relationship between so-called admissible assumption sets and protected sets. A set of
assumptions S is admissible if
(1) S does not attack itself, and
(2) for all sets of assumptions S′, if S′ attacks some φ ∈ S, then S attacks some φ′ ∈ S′.
Maximal admissible sets S are used in [5] for defining extensions of form Th(W ∪ S)
that differ from Reiter’s extensions. Consider theory ({ :¬a
a
, a :b
c
, :¬c¬c },∅). While the only
admissible set is ∅, we get an additional protected set, namely { :¬c¬c }. The concept of
extensions defined by maximal protected sets is elaborated upon in [31].
6. Characterizations of default proofs
This section addresses the extension-membership problem. This problem has actually
three dimensions: First, the decision-oriented one that is merely concerned with the abstract
question whether a default theory has an extension containing a given formula. Second,
the proof-oriented one that aims at providing an adequate notion of a default proof. And
finally the algorithmic dimension that deals with query-answering procedures whose aim
is then to find the aforementioned default proofs. In what follows, our emphasis lies on
the characterization of default proofs rather than the algorithmic aspects dealing with the
search for these proofs.
6.1. Formal foundations for default proofs
The discussion in the last section was dominated by the consideration of maximal sets
of default rules D′ in Theorem 5.3. It is however important to notice that D′ needs not
to be maximal. This is because classical logic allows us to sanction viable parts of an
extension E, given by W ∪ Conseq(D′), without constructing the remaining part E′. In
fact, taking D′ as a grounded subset of some generating default rules attributes to it the
character of an extension-dependent default proof: Given the set of generating default rules
GD(D,E) for an extension E, a default proof of some formula ϕ is simply a grounded
set D′ ⊆GD(D,E) such that W ∪Conseq(D′) |= ϕ. In the context furnished by E, we do
neither have to care about the consistent application of the rules in D′ (this is assured
by D′ ⊆ GD(D,E)) nor (trivially) about the existence of an encompassing extension.
Both issues, addressed by conditions (2) and (3) in Theorem 5.3, are however of crucial
importance, whenever no such extension is provided.
For example, in default theory (1), the set D′ = {δb, δf } may serve as a default proof
for f . It satisfies conditions (1) and (2) in Theorem 5.3 because it is grounded and protected
with respect to (1). For showing that f belongs to an existing extension, we must show that
∆|D′ is coherent. This can be accomplished without computing such an extension. We get
a non-conflicting theory
∆|D′ = (D \ ({δb, δf } ∪ {δ¬f }),W ∪ {f,b})= ({δw}, {p,abp,f, b})
which must have a single extension due to its arcless block graph. Hence, we can show that
f is a default conclusion of (1) without computing the corresponding extension.
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The following corollary to Theorem 5.3 makes the previous ideas precise.
Corollary 6.1. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let ϕ be a formula.
We have that ϕ ∈E for some extension E of ∆ iff
W ∪Conseq(D′) |= ϕ
for some D′ ⊆D such that
(1) D′ is grounded in W ,
(2) D′ is protected in ∆, and
(3) ∆|D′ is coherent.
The formation of default proofs thus boils down to finding a grounded and protected set
of default rules that allows for deriving a query, provided that it is applicable within an
existing extension.
Whenever condition (3) can be addressed by one of the criteria given in Section 4,
Corollary 6.1 represents a characterization of default proofs expressed entirely in terms
of blocking and supporting sets. In case ∆|D′ agrees with the syntactic formats stipulated
in either of [10,21,39], these approaches work just as fine. The test is trivial if ∆|D′ is
normal or non-conflicting.
6.2. Default proofs from non-conflicting default theories
For conceptual clarity, we start with default proofs for the simple case of non-conflicting
default theories.
Definition 6.1 (Pure default proof 12 ). Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory and ϕ a
formula.
A set of default rules P ⊆D is a pure default proof for ϕ from ∆ iff
P1 W ∪Conseq(P ) |= ϕ,
P2 P is grounded in W .
We see that basic blocking sets are pure default proofs for negated justifications. Observe
that the simple nature of non-conflicting theories makes consistency checks obsolete. For
example, let ∆′′ be the default theory obtained from (1) by leaving out b :¬abb
f
. Then, ∆′′
is non-conflicting and P = {p :¬abp¬f } is a pure default proof for ¬f . This proof can be
found without consistency checking nor any measures guaranteeing the existence of an
encompassing extension.
We observe the following result for non-conflicting default theories.
Theorem 6.2. Let ∆ be a non-conflicting default theory and ϕ a formula.
We have that ϕ ∈E for an extensionE of∆ iff there is a pure default proof for ϕ from∆.
12 Observe that although pure default proofs ignore justifications, they are still non-monotonic in the sense that
they may be invalidated after augmenting the underlying non-conflicting theory.
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6.3. Default proofs from conflicting yet coherent default theories
Whenever we have a conflicting yet coherent default theory, we have to take supporting
sets into account because then it is necessary to protect the constituent default rules of a
default proof. This leads us to the concept of protected default proofs.
Definition 6.2 (Protected default proof ). Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory and ϕ a
formula.
A set of default rules P ⊆D is a protected default proof for ϕ from ∆ iff
PP1 P is a pure default proof for ϕ from∆,
PP2 P is protected in ∆.
Note that this characterization substitutes global consistency checks by the determina-
tion of supporting sets. In fact, any protected default proof consists of rules needed for
deriving ϕ and supplementary rules needed for protecting the derivation against blocking
sets. Hence, we have to make sure that there is some supporting set for each default in the
proof, as expressed in the following definition.
The next result shows that it is sufficient to inspect the set γ ?(P ) of all reachable prede-
cessors (in the block graph) of a pure default proof P when checking its protectedness.
Theorem 6.3. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let P ⊆D be a pure default proof
for ϕ from ∆.
If default theory (γ ?(P ),W) has extension E with ϕ ∈ E, then there is a protected
default proof for ϕ from (D,W).
Observe that without any restriction on the theory, the existence of a protected default
proof for ϕ does not guarantee an extension containing ϕ. That is, soundness and
completeness necessitate coherent theories (cf. Theorem 6.4).
For illustration, let us return to the even default theory in (1). We have seen in Section 6.2
that
P = {δ¬f } =
{
p : ¬abp
¬f
}
(22)
is a pure default proof for ¬f , that is, PP1 holds. For verifying PP2, we must address
PTD1 and PTD2. For PTD1, it is sufficient to observe that the members of P are not
connected in the block graph. The fact that S∆(δ¬f )= {{δ¬f }} establishes PTD2. Hence
P is a protected default proof for ¬f from (1). Provided that one uses approximation
condition (17) for establishing PTD2, this proof is found without any consistency checks
and no measures guaranteeing the existence of an encompassing extension.
Similar arguments show that
P ′ =
{
p : b
b
,
b : ¬abb
f
}
and P ′′ =
{
p : b
b
,
b : w
w
}
(23)
are protected default proofs for f and w from Theory (1), respectively. Note that we only
have to warrant a supporting set for b :¬abb
f
since it is the only default rule in P ′ ∪ P ′′
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having a predecessor in the block graph. As with p :¬abp¬f above, however,
b :¬abb
f
supports
itself, so that no other defaults have to be taken into account. The second default proof is
formed without any supporting sets.
As a result, we get that protected default proofs furnish a sound and complete concept
for addressing the extension-membership problem on coherent, or in our case even default
theories.
Theorem 6.4. Let ∆= (D,W) be an even default theory and ϕ a formula.
We have that ϕ ∈ E for an extension E of ∆ iff there is a protected default proof for ϕ
from ∆.
The stipulation of evenness stems from the fact that it relies, as protectedness, on the
underlying block graph. Thus the interplay of both concepts can be characterized in a direct
way. However, evenness should not be seen as a restriction on coherent theories. There
should be more general classes of coherent default theories, guaranteeing correctness and
completeness of protected default proofs.
As a corollary to Theorem 6.6, we obtain that deciding whether there is a protected
default proof for formula ϕ from a default theory is in 6P2 .
6.4. Default proofs from general default theories
When dealing with arbitrary default theories, we must guarantee that a default proof
resides in an encompassing extension. Clearly, this should be done without computing such
an extension. Given a protected default proof P from a theory∆, this can be accomplished
by checking whether ∆|P is coherent.
Definition 6.3 (General default proof ). Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory and ϕ a
formula.
A set of default rules P ⊆D is a general default proof for ϕ from ∆ iff
DP1 P is a protected default proof for ϕ from ∆,
DP2 ∆|P is coherent.
For illustration, let us add self-circular default rule ζ¬f = :f¬f to the theory in (1). The
resulting theory ∆′ has a single extension: Th(W ∪ {b,w,¬f }). The block graph of ∆′ is
Fig. 2. Block graph of ∆′.
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given in Fig. 2. It is obtained from the one in Fig. 1 by adding arcs (ζ¬f , ζ¬f ), (δ¬f , ζ¬f ),
and (ζ¬f , δf ). In what follows, we reconsider the previous protected default proofs in the
light of this change.
We start with the protected default proof given in (22), viz.
P = {δ¬f } =
{
p : ¬abp
¬f
}
.
For establishing DP1, we observe that the set of predecessors of δ¬f remains unchanged.
For verifying DP2, we consider the block graph of ∆′|P , which is obtained from Γ∆′ by
deleting arcs and vertices. First, we delete in Γ∆′ all defaults in P = {δ¬f } along with all
adjacent arcs. The same is done with δf and ζ¬f becauseW ∪Conseq({δ¬f }) |= ¬Justif (δ)
for δ ∈ {δf , ζ¬f } (cf. Definition 5.2). As a result, we obtain a graph with vertex set {δw, δb}
and no arcs. This implies that ∆′|P is coherent and hence that P is a general default proof
for ¬f from ∆′.
Next, consider the first protected proof in (23), viz.
P ′ = {δb, δf } =
{
p : b
b
,
b : ¬abb
f
}
. (24)
Unlike above, we encounter an additional predecessor of P ′ in the augmented block graph,
namely ζ¬f . The predecessors of ζ¬f yield two candidates for forming a supporting set:
δ¬f and ζ¬f . We see that their common consequent ¬f is inconsistent with those in P ′.
In other words, augmenting P ′ by either of them would violate PP2, that is, PTD1. Hence
there is no way to form a supporting set for δf and so P ′ is no protected default proof from
∆′. This is reflected by the fact that ∆′ has no extension containing f .
Finally, let us consider the second protected proof in (23), viz.
P ′′ = {δb, δw} =
{
p : b
b
,
b : w
w
}
.
Although the absence of predecessors of P ′′ in Γ∆′|P ′′ establishes DP1, the rules in P ′′
are insufficient to guarantee an encompassing extension since there is an odd cycle in
Γ∆′|P ′′ , as shown in Fig. 3. In contrast to the proof in (24), we may strengthen P ′′ in
order to establish DP2. To see this, observe that there is an arc entering the odd cycle,
namely (δ¬f , ζ¬f ). This indicates that δ¬f may block ζ¬f . Hence, consider P ′′ ∪ {δ¬f }.
The fact that {δb, δw} ∪ {δ¬f } satisfies DP1 is established as shown above. For DP2, we
must inspect the block graph of ∆′|(P ′′ ∪ {δ¬f }), which turns out to be the empty graph.
In all, P ′′ ∪ {δ¬f } is thus a valid default proof for w from ∆′.
Fig. 3. Block graph of ∆′|P ′′.
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We note how the block graph indicated a way to eliminate the odd cycle in the resulting
block graph. Condition DP2 may thus be verified by first eliminating the defaults involved
in the default proof from the block graph and then by checking whether the resulting block
graph is even, acyclic, or arcless. In order to apply these criteria, however, we might have
to add additional rules eliminating dangerous odd cycles. These additional rules can be
identified by means of the results in Section 4.3.
We have the following result, establishing soundness and completeness in the general
case.
Theorem 6.5. Let ∆= (D,W) be a (general) default theory and ϕ a formula.
We have that ϕ ∈ E for an extension E of ∆ iff there is a general default proof for ϕ
from ∆.
We have seen that the formation of default proofs benefits considerably from the usage
of block graphs. That is, we may restrict our attention to ultimately necessary default rules
and so avoid constructing entire extensions.
Finally, it follows from Theorem 6.5 that the existence of general default proofs is
decidable within the complexity class of the extension-membership problem, as made
precise in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.6. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and ϕ a formula.
The problem of deciding whether there is a general default proof for ϕ from ∆ is in 6P2 .
7. Conclusion
We have introduced new theoretical foundations for default logic. The fundamental idea
was to avoid global concepts like fixed-point conditions and exhaustive consistency checks
by replacing them by rather local concepts that allow for considering only strictly necessary
default information. This was accomplished by putting forward the notion of blockage.
Our formal account of blockage is given by the concept of (essential) blocking sets. These
can be regarded as specific, redundancy-free instances of attacking arguments, used in
the abstract frameworks of argumentation semantics [5,19]. In contrast to these unifying
frameworks, however, our elaboration is specific to default logic. This has led to much
stronger and many additional results than obtained at the abstract level [5,19].
In our specific setting, blocking sets represent context-independent proof skeletons that
may be used for refuting a default rule’s justification. That is, for a default rule there may
be some extension containing such a blocking set that inhibits the application of the rule.
Thus, given only a rule and one of its blocking sets, we cannot decide whether the rule
applies without any information about the extension at hand. The situation is different with
supporting sets. Clearly, supporting sets are also context-independent. But unlike blocking
sets, they are supposed to apply in the same extension as their supported rule. In fact,
the joint application of a rule and one of its supporting sets can only be denied by a self-
blocking part of the theory that destroys an encompassing extension. Thus, given a rule and
one of its supporting sets, we can decide whether the rule (and its supporting set) applies
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whenever we can rule out sources of incoherence. From a general complexity-theoretic
point of view, solving a coherence problem is as hard as constructing an encompassing
extension. In our case, however, the block graph makes the difference since it indicates
sources of incoherence.
The block graph furnishes our instrument for abstracting from particular blocking
situations, while keeping the essential interaction patterns between default rules. In view
of the possibly exponential number of blocking sets, it is thus a trade-off between full
blockage information and feasible space complexity. For improving the quality of the
resulting block graphs, we tried to eliminate as many redundant blocking sets as possible.
This has led us to the concept of essential blocking sets that are provably as effective as
basic blocking sets.
The block graph tells us which default rules must be considered for applying a rule
in question. This can be made more precise by returning to the classification of default
theories, given in the introductory section. Consider the applicability of a set of rules P :
(1) The fact that a theory contains no (blocking) interactions corresponds to an arcless
block graph. For establishing the applicability of P , it is thus sufficient to verify
groundedness of P ; no other rules must be inspected.
(2) The fact that a theory contains merely direct interactions is mirrored by an even (or
acyclic) block graph. For establishing the applicability of P , it is sufficient to verify
groundedness and protectedness of P . This necessitates the inspection of γ ?(P ),
namely P and all reachable predecessors of rules in P in the block graph.
(3) The fact that a theory comprises both direct and indirect interactions amounts in our
framework to a non-even block graph. For establishing the applicability of P , we
are obliged to verify in addition to groundedness and protectedness of P , also the
coherent interplay of P with the rest of the theory. This necessities the inspection
of all default rulesD: While γ ?(P ) is considered for establishing groundedness and
protectedness of P , the coherent interplay of P and (D \P) is taken care of through
the block graph of ∆|P .
The block graph’s role for limiting the search space by delineating the scope of default rules
that must be inspected for validating the application of a set of default rules is made precise
in a restricted semi-monotonicity result. This result is to the best of our knowledge the first
one capturing semi-monotonicity beyond normal default theories in Reiter’s default logic.
Practically, the block graph can be obtained from an initial analysis of the default theory.
Notably it is of quadratic space complexity, unlike other approaches like [26,47] that face
an exponential blow-up in the worst case; its computational complexity amounts in the
worst case to that of the extension-membership problem. The initial effort put into the
block graph pays off the more, the sparser the block graph.
In all, the block graph (along with its underlying blocking sets) provide a powerful
structural tool for analyzing default theories, as demonstrated by a variety of applications:
Existence-of-Extension Problem. We address this problem by furnishing a range of
criteria guaranteeing the existence of extensions, each of which can be read off the block
graph in polynomial time. We show that these criteria are simpler and go beyond existing
approaches. Our criteria are fully syntax-independent and allow for treating general default
theories. For a complement, we give also a criterion indicating non-existence of extensions.
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Although all these criteria provide no complete characterization of default theories with
and without extensions, they furnish nonetheless easy graph based tests that allow us to
shorten the gap between both classes of theories.
We can decide the existence-of-extension problem when considering blocking sets.
Although this faces exponential space complexity in practice, this result is to the best of
our knowledge the first complete characterization of (arbitrary) coherent default theories.
Characterizations of Extensions. We obtain novel characterizations of extensions that do
not only avoid global consistency checks but also eliminate the usual fixed-point condition.
These characterizations are not only of theoretical importance but they are also of
practical relevance. We show in [32] that extension construction can be decomposed into
an incremental construction of a Łukaszewicz-extension [34] and a block-graph-based
condition.
Extension-Membership Problem. We provide a series of characterizations of default
proofs along the classification of default theories described above. In each case, we give a
soundness and completeness result.
To the best of our knowledge, these characterizations furnish the first definitions
of default proofs in Reiter’s default logic that do not refer to an outer extension.
This is reflected by the fact that up to now all computational approaches to the
extension-membership problem are extension-oriented [12,26,38,47]. In contrast to this,
our characterizations of default proofs avoid exhaustive consistency checks and rather
focus on the strictly necessary default rules.
Apart from these applications, our blockage-based concepts allow for addressing various
other issues. First, the block graph furnishes sufficient conditions for restricting or even
omitting consistency checks. Second, as detailed in [33], it provides means for supporting
skeptical and modular reasoning. And finally its resulting concepts, like protectedness,
allow us to make the relationship to Łukaszewicz’s interpretation of default theories much
more precise, as shown in [31].
Given this fundamental framework, one may now divide a computational problem like
query-answering in an off-line and an on-line process: One may start with an analytic
compilation phase resulting in the block graph Γ∆ of a default theory ∆. The subsequent
query-answering phase aims at finding a default proof P such that ∆|P possesses an
extension. The unavoidable examination of the entire set of default rules is then done only
once in the compilation phase; this allows for inspecting only the ultimately necessary
default rules during the actual query answering phase. To be more precise, a default rule
belongs to P only
(i) if it contributes to the derivation of the query or if it is needed,
(ii) for supporting a constituent rule of the proof, or
(iii) for supporting an encompassing extension.
While (i) is fixed by the standard inferential relation, (ii) and (iii) are determined
by the block graph. For delineating such a proof, we can draw on Γ∆ for detecting
and eventually recomputing the blocking and supporting sets of its constituent rules.
Blocking sets are found among the direct predecessors of a rule, while the search for
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its supporting sets can be restricted to its pre-predecessors. Analogous decompositions of
other computational problems like extension construction are straightforward and should
arguably be mutually beneficial for existing computational approaches. Of particular
interest are also computational approaches to argumentation, e.g., [27].
To sum up, the salient contribution of our paper was to shift global, extension-based
concepts in default logic towards local, proof-oriented ones. For instance, we have shown
how to replace global consistency checks by rather local proof-based constructions that
are guided by the underlying block graph. This provides a formal account of “local
constructibility” that was up to now always associated with semi-monotonic default
theories.
The next major steps on this research avenue are manifold. One such avenue will deal
with algorithmic and implementation-oriented issues that exploit the theoretical framework
proposed in this paper. Another one has to address more fine-grained complexity issues.
For instance, is it possible to characterize restricted classes of theories having particular
block graphs that lead to reduced complexity? Dually, one may also consider well-known
fragments, like logic programming, and investigate their particular blockage structure.
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Appendix A. Graph-theoretical background
Definition A.1. A directed graphG is a pairG= (V ,A) such that V is a finite, non-empty
set of vertices and A ⊆ V × V is a set of arcs. If G is a directed graph G−1 = (V ,A′)
denotes the directed graph where the orientation for all arcs in G is switched, formally,
(u, v) ∈A′ iff (v,u) ∈A.
A directed cycle in G= (V ,A) is a finite subset C ⊆ V such that C = {v1, . . . , vn} and
(vi, vi+1) ∈A for each 16 i < n and (vn, v1) ∈A. The arcs A(C) of a cycle C are defined
as A(C)= {(vi , vi+1) | 16 i < n} ∪ {(vn, v1)}. The length of a directed cycle in a graph is
the total number of arcs occurring in the cycle. Additionally, we call a cycle even (odd) if
its length is even (odd).
Definition A.2. Let G= (V ,A) be a directed graph and U ⊆ V a subset of vertices. U is
independent with respect to G iff for all u,v ∈ U we have (u, v) /∈A.
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Thus a subset U ⊆ V is independent with respect to a graph (V ,A) if there is no arc
between nodes in U .
Definition A.3. Let G= (V ,A) be a directed graph and K ⊆ V an independent subset of
vertices.K is a kernel of G iff for all nodes u ∈ V \K exists a v ∈K such that (u, v) ∈A.
A kernel K is an independent set of vertices such that for every vertex not in K there is
an arc to some vertex in K .
Theorem A.1 [42]. Let G= (V ,A) be a directed graph without odd cycles, then G has a
kernel.
For a directed graphG= (V ,A) and a vertex v ∈ V , we define the set of all predecessors
of v as γ−1(v) = {u | (u, v) ∈ A}. All reachable predecessors γ ?(v) of v are defined as
follows:
γ ?(v)=
⋃
i∈I
γ−i (v),
where γ−0(v) = {v} and for all i > 1 we have γ−i (v) = {u | (u,w) ∈ A and w ∈
γ−(i−1)(v)}. For a set of vertices U ⊆ V , we define
γ ?(U)=
⋃
v∈U
γ ?(v).
Appendix B. Proofs of results
B.1. Auxiliary technical results
First, we recall the following specification of extensions [40].
Theorem B.1. Let (D,W) be a default theory and let E be a set of formulas.
Define E0 =W and for i > 0
Ei+1 = Th(Ei) ∪
{
γ
∣∣∣∣ α : βγ ∈D,α ∈Ei,¬β /∈E
}
.
Then, E is an extension of (D,W) iff E =⋃i>0Ei.
The above procedure is not strictly iterative sinceE appears in the specification of Ei+1.
We need the following lemmas and theorems when proving the results of this paper. All
proofs for the results in this subsection are straight forward and can be found in [29]. The
next lemma gives a further property of grounded sets of default rules, namely that the union
of grounded sets is also grounded under certain conditions.
Lemma B.2. Let D1 andD2 be enumerable sets of default rules,D =D1 ∪D2 andW be
a set of formulas. If D1 is grounded in W and D2 is grounded in W ∪ Conseq(D1), then
D is grounded in W .
T. Linke, T. Schaub / Artificial Intelligence 124 (2000) 31–86 69
Now we are ready to formulate an alternative characterization of the extensions of a
default theory which serves as a theoretical basis for proving the further results.
Theorem B.3. Let (D,W) be a default theory and let E be a set of formulas. Then, E is
an extension of (D,W) iff
(1) E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E))) and
(2) GD(D,E) is grounded in W .
Lemma B.4. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory and D1 ⊆ D a subset of default
rules such that default theory (D1,W) has extension E1 and default theory (D,E1) has
extension E2. If GD(D1,E1)⊆GD(D,E2), then E2 is an extension of ∆.
Lemma B.5. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory. Then Γ∆ has an odd cycle iff Ω∆ has
an odd cycle.
Lemma B.6. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory, δ ∈ D a default rule and C a subset
of D. If C is a complete support of δ then C is grounded in W .
B.2. Proofs of results occurring in the text
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let B ⊆ D and δ ∈ D. If B = ∅ the proposition trivially holds.
Thus let B 6= ∅ for the rest of this proof.
By Definition 3.1 B ∈ B∆(δ) is equivalent to B 7→∆ δ and BS3. That is, B 7→∆ δ and(
B \ {δ′}) 67→∆ δ′′ for each δ′ ∈ B and each δ′′ ∈B ∪ {δ}.
This is equivalent to B 7→∆ δ and(
B \ {δ′}) 67→∆ δ for each δ′ ∈ B and(
B \ {δ′}) 67→∆ δ′′ for each δ′ ∈ B and each δ′′ ∈B.
According to Definition 3.1, this is equivalent to B 7→∆ δ and
B ′ 67→∆ δ for each B ′ ⊂ B and
B ′ 67→∆ δ′′ for each B ′ ⊂ B and each δ′′ ∈B.
Finally, this is equivalent to
B 7→∆ δ and
B ′ 7→∆ δ for no B ′ ⊂ B and
B ′ 7→∆ δ′′ for no B ′ ⊂ B and no δ′′ ∈ B. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let E be an extension of default theory ∆= (D,W) and δ ∈D.
According to Theorem B.3 we have E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E))) and GD(D,E) is
grounded in W .
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First we prove that (1) and (3) are equivalent. If E |= ¬Justif (δ) then W ∪
Conseq(GD(D,E)) |= ¬Justif (δ). Then there is a minimal set B ⊆ GD(D,E) such that
B 7→∆ δ. That is, B ′ 7→∆ δ for no B ′ ⊂ B .
Now let δ′, δ′′ ∈ B . If B \ {δ′} is not grounded in W then by Definition 3.1 we
have B \ {δ′} 67→∆ δ′′. Now let B \ {δ′} be grounded in W . Because B ⊆ GD(D,E),
it follows E 6|= ¬Justif (δ′′) for each δ′′ ∈ B . By monotonicity of |= we obtain that
W ∪ Conseq(B \ {δ′}) 6|= ¬Justif (δ′′) for each δ′′ ∈ B . Hence B \ {δ′} 7→∆ δ′′ for no
δ′, δ′′ ∈ B , which implies B ′ 7→∆ δ′′ for no B ′ ⊂ B and no δ′′ ∈ B . By Theorem 3.1 we
conclude B ∈ B∆(δ). The other direction trivialy holds.
Next, we prove that (1) and (2) are equivalent. If E is an extension such that E |=
¬Justif (δ), then W ∪ Conseq(GD(D,E)) |= ¬Justif (δ). Hence there is a minimal subset
B ′ ⊆ GD(D,E) such that B ′ 7→∆ δ. According to Definition 3.1 the other direction also
holds.
Trivially, (2) and (4) are equivalent by Definition 3.1. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let D′ ⊆D be a grounded set of default rules.
If D′ is weakly regular, then for each δ ∈D′ we have W ∪ Conseq(D′) 6|= ¬Justif (δ).
Assume that there is a δ ∈ D′ and there is a B ∈ B∆(δ) such that B ⊆ D′. Then by
Definitions 3.1 and 3.1 we have W ∪Conseq(B) |= ¬Justif (δ). Because B ⊆D′ it follows
W ∪Conseq(D′) |= ¬Justif (δ)which is a contradiction to the fact thatD′ is weakly regular.
Hence for each δ ∈D′ and each B ∈ B∆(δ) we have B 6⊆D′.
For the other direction letB /∈ B∆(δ) for each δ ∈D′ and for each B ⊆D′. By definition,
this implies B 67→∆ δ and thus B is not grounded inW orW ∪Conseq(B) 6|= ¬Justif (δ) for
each δ ∈D′ and for each B ⊆D′. Assuming that D′ would not be weakly regular means
that there is some δ ∈D′ such that W ∪ Conseq(D′) |= ¬Justif (δ). It follows that there is
a minimal subset B ⊆D′ such that B is grounded in W (since D′ is grounded in W ) and
W ∪Conseq(B) |= ¬Justif (δ). Since this contradicts the fact that according to our premise
we have B is not grounded in W or W ∪Conseq(B) 6|= ¬Justif (δ) for each δ ∈D′ and for
each B ⊆D′ it follows that D′ is weakly regular. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let ∆ = (D,W) and ∆′ = (D′,W) be default theories with
D ⊆D′ and δ ∈D. Let B ∈ B∆(δ). Then B ⊆D′ and B 7→∆ δ and BS3 by Definition 3.1.
Because conditions B 67→∆ δ and BS3 are independent from D \B it follows that they are
also independent fromD′ \B and thus B is a set of default rules fulfilling these conditions
with respect to ∆′. That is, B ∈ B∆′(δ).
Under the premise that B ⊆ D the same argument shows that B ∈ B∆′(δ) implies
B ∈ B∆(δ). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.5. For this proof we need the following proposition.
Proposition B.7 [22, Proposition 1.1]. Let R be a set of monotonic inference rules of
the form ϕ1,...,ϕn
ψ
. Let T be the modal theory obtained by replacing each rule in R
by Lϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lϕn → ψ. Then for every set of propositional formulas I and every
propositional formula ω, we have that ω belongs to the least set of formulas containing
I and closed under propositional consequence and the rule from R iff I ∪ T |=N ω.
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For a default rule δ = α :β
γ
define
tm(δ)= Lα→ γ.
Observe that tm(δ) is a monotonic inference rule. For a set of defaults D′ define
tm(D
′)= {tm(δ) | δ ∈D′}.
Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory and let δ ∈D and B ⊆D.
According to [45, Theorem 6], we know that reasoning in N and NT is computationally
equivalent to reasoning in propositional logic. That is, the problem of deciding if I |=S ϕ
for a given finite set I of modal formulas and a given modal formula ϕ is co-NP-complete
(for S being modal logics N or NT).
Since in Definition 3.1 defaults are treated as monotonic inference rules (justification are
not considered) it follows from Proposition B.7 that B 7→∆ δ iff tn(B)∪W |=S ¬Justif (δ).
Thus the problem of deciding whether relation 7→∆ holds for a given set of defaults and
a given default is reducible to the problem of deciding whether relation |=S holds for a
given set of formulas and a given formula. Therefore the first problem is at least as hard
as the second one, which is co-NP-complete. Thus deciding whether B 7→∆ δ holds is in
co-NP. 13 2
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Let B ⊆D be a subset of default rules and let δ ∈D be a default
rule. According to Definition 3.1 we have that B is a blocking set for δ iff
B 7→∆ δ and (B.1)
∀δ′ ∈B: ∀δ? ∈ B ∪ {δ}: B \ {δ′} 67→∆ δ?. (B.2)
Therefore, to verify that a given set B is a blocking set for a given default δ can be done
by (n(n+ 1)+ 1)= n2 + n+ 1 times testing the relation 7→∆. According to Theorem 3.5,
testing whether for a given set B and a given default δ we have B 7→∆ δ is in co-NP. Thus
testing whetherB ∈ B∆(δ) can be done with a polynomial number of calls to an NP-oracle.
In order to show that there is a blocking set for a given default δ we may guess a subset
B ⊆D nondeterministically and check that δ′′ ∈ B and that B ∈ B∆(δ). Thus the problem
of deciding whether there is a blocking set for δ is nondeterministically Turing-reducible
to a co-NP-complete problem (propositional SAT) and hence in 6P2 . 2
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Let δ ∈ D. B ′ ∈ f (B∆(δ)) iff B ′ = f (B) for some B ∈ B∆(δ).
This is according to Definition 3.1 equivalent to the following conditions:
W ∪Conseq(B) |= ¬Justif (δ) and
B is grounded in W and
∀δ′ ∈B: ∀δ′′ ∈ B ∪ {δ}: B \ {δ′} 67→∆ δ′′.
13 Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between modal logic N and reasoning with monotonic inference
rules and propositional logic the problem is co-NP-complete.
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By definition this is equivalent to
W ∪Conseq(B) |= ¬Justif (δ) and
B is grounded in W and
∀δ′ ∈B: ∀δ′′ ∈ B ∪ {δ}:(
W ∪Conseq(B \ {δ′}) 6|= ¬Justif (δ′′) or
B \ {δ′} is not grounded in W).
Since Th(W)= Th(W ′) this is equivalent to
W ′ ∪Conseq(B) |= ¬Justif (δ) and
B is grounded in W ′ and
∀δ′ ∈B: ∀δ′′ ∈ B ∪ {δ}:(
W ′ ∪Conseq(B \ {δ′}) 6|= ¬Justif (δ′′) or
B \ {δ′} is not grounded in W ′).
According to Definition 3.2 this is equivalent to
W ′ ∪Conseq(B ′) |= ¬Justif (f (δ)) and
B ′ is grounded in W ′ and
∀f (δ′) ∈ B ′: ∀f (δ′′) ∈B ′ ∪ {f (δ)}:(
W ′ ∪Conseq(B ′ \ {f (δ′)}) 6|= ¬Justif (f (δ′′)) or
B ′ \ {f (δ′)} is not grounded in W ′).
By definition this is equivalent to B ′ ∈ B∆′(f (δ)). In all for each δ ∈D we get
f
(B∆(δ))= B∆′(f (δ)). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory such that n = |D| and let
G= (D,A) be a directed graph with nodes D.
In order to decide whether G = Γ∆ we may guess a set B(δ,δ′) ⊆ D for each possible
arc (δ, δ′) ∈D×D in G nondeterministically. That is, we guess n2 subsets of default rules
nondeterministically. Next, for each of this subsets B(δ,δ′) we check that δ ∈ B(δ,δ′) and
that (δ, δ′) ∈ A and that B(δ,δ′) ∈ B∆(δ′). Observe that the first and second of this checks
can be done directly (without calling an oracle) and the last check can be done with a
polynomial number of calls to an NP-oracle (see proof of Theorem 3.6). Altogether we
need a polynomial number of calls to an NP-oracle, because we have to process n2 subsets
B(δ,δ′) and the multiplication of polynomials leads to polynomials. Thus the problem of
deciding whether G= Γ∆ can be done with a polynomial number of calls to an NP-oracle
and hence is in 6P2 . 2
Proof of Corollary 3.9. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.4. 2
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Proof of Corollary 3.10. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.7. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.11. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory, δ ∈ D and let E be an
extension of ∆. Furthermore let S ∈ S∆(δ) be a supporting set of δ. If S ⊆ GD(D,E)
then by Definition 3.4 there is no blocking set for δ in GD(D,E). Therefore from
E |= Prereq(δ) it follows by definition of the generating defaults of an extension that
δ ∈GD(D,E). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.12. (1) and (2) follow immediately from Definitions 3.1 and 3.4,
respectively. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.1. If ∆= (D,W) is non-conflicting then we have A∆ = ∅.
Let D′ be a maximal subset of D, which is grounded in W . Observe that D′ is unique.
Define
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)). (B.3)
We now prove that E is an extension of ∆ = (D,W) by showing the following two
statements
E = Th(Conseq(GD(D,E)) ∪W ) and (B.4)
GD(D,E) is grounded in W. (B.5)
Then by Theorem B.3 E is an extension of∆. It is sufficient to show thatD′ =GD(D,E),
because this implies (B.4) and (B.5). Because of (B.3), D′ is grounded in W and E =
Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)), for all δ′ ∈D′ we have
E |= Prereq(δ′). (B.6)
Assume there is a δ′ ∈D′ such that E |= ¬Justif (δ′). ThenD′ is not weakly regular with
respect toW and Theorem 3.3 implies that there is δ ∈D′ andB ⊆D′ such thatB ∈ B∆(δ).
Thus, according to Definitions 3.3 and 3.1, for each δ ∈ B we have (δ, δ′) ∈ A∆, which
is a contradiction to the fact that ∆ is non-conflicting. Thus, there is no δ′ ∈ D′ with
E |= ¬Justif (δ′) and it follows E 6|= ¬Justif (δ′) for each δ′ ∈ D′. Hence, with (B.6) we
have D′ ⊆GD(D,E).
By definition, if δ ∈ GD(D,E) then E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)) |= Prereq(δ). Thus
δ ∈ D′, because otherwise D′ would not be a maximal subset of D, which is grounded
in W . Finally, we obtain D′ =GD(D,E) and are done. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.2. That every well-ordered default theory has at least one extension
is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.3, since the proof of Theorem 4.3 does not rely on
Theorem 4.2.
It remains to show that every well-ordered theory has exactly one extension. Assume
that ∆ = (D,W) is well-ordered and has two different extensions E1 and E2. Then the
corresponding sets of generating defaults GD(D,E1) and GD(D,E2) are different and
both grounded in W . Clearly, there are enumerations 〈δi〉i∈I of GD(D,E1) and 〈δ′i〉j∈J of
GD(D,E2) such that (3) holds for both of them and there is a maximal k for which the
following condition holds:
δi = δ′i for all i, j 6 k and δk+1 6= δ′k+1. (B.7)
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That is, there are no other enumerations of GD(D,E1) and GD(D,E2) with a greater k
fulfilling condition (B.7).
Observe that {δ1, . . . , δk+1} and {δ′1, . . . , δ′k+1} are grounded in W . Furthermore, we
have thatW ∪Conseq({δ1, . . . , δk+1}) |= ¬Justif (δ′k+1) andW ∪Conseq({δ′1, . . . , δ′k+1}) |=¬Justif (δk+1), because otherwise k would not be maximal. Since {δ1, . . . , δk+1} ⊆
GD(D,E1) and {δ′1, . . . , δ′k+1} ⊆ GD(D,E2), according to Theorem 3.2, there are
minimal subsets B ⊆ {δ1, . . . , δk+1} and B ′ ⊆ {δ′1, . . . , δ′k+1} such that B ∈ B∆(δ′k+1) and
B ′ ∈ B∆(δk+1). By Definition 3.3 this implies that ∆ is not well-ordered, which is a
contradiction. Hence, every well-ordered default theory has a single extension. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.3. If Γ∆ has no odd cycles, then according to Lemma B.5 Ω∆ has
no odd cycles. Trivially,Ω−1∆ has no odd cycles. With Theorem A.1 there is a kernelK for
Ω−1∆ . According to Definition A.3 of a kernel, the following two conditions hold for K:
K is independent with respect to Ω∆ and (B.8)
∀B ∈ VΩ∆ \K: ∃B ′ ∈K such that (B ′,B) ∈AΩ∆. (B.9)
That is, K is an inverse kernel ofΩ∆. According to Theorem 4.4,∆ has an extension. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory such that Ω∆ has an inverse
kernel K . Then we have
K is independent with respect to Ω∆ and (B.10)
∀B ∈ VΩ∆ \K: ∃B ′ ∈K such that (B ′,B) ∈AΩ∆. (B.11)
Define K? =⋃B∈K B , the union of all blocking sets in K . Because each blocking set is
grounded in W , with Lemma B.2 it follows that K? is grounded in W . Additionally, we
have that for each δ ∈K? there is a blocking set B ∈K with δ ∈ B .
Let δ ∈K? and assume W ∪Conseq(K?) |= ¬Justif (δ). Then K? is not weakly regular
with respect to W . According to Theorem 3.3, it follows that there is δ′ ∈ K? and there
is B ′ ⊆K? such that B ′ ∈ B∆(δ′). If B ′ ∈K we obtain a contradiction to (B.10), because
otherwise there would be a B ∈ K with δ′ ∈ B and thus (B ′,B) ∈ AΩ∆ . If B ′ /∈ K there
is a B ∈ K such that (B,B ′) ∈ AΩ∆ (see (B.11)). Then, by definition there is a δ′′ ∈ B ′
with B ∈ B∆(δ′′). Because B ′ ⊆ K?, it follows δ′′ ∈ K?. Hence, there is B ′′ ∈ K with
δ′′ ∈ B ′′. Putting all together, we obtain B,B ′′ ∈ K , δ′′ ∈ B ′′ and B ∈ B∆(δ′′). This
implies (B,B ′′) ∈AΩ∆ , which again is a contradiction to (B.10). Therefore we have that the
assumption was false and K? is weakly regular with respect to W , that is, for all δ ∈ K?
we obtain
W ∪Conseq(K?) 6|= ¬Justif (δ). (B.12)
Now define
E? = Th(W ∪Conseq(K?)). (B.13)
With the fact that K? is grounded in W and with (B.12) we conclude GD(K?,E?)=K?.
Thus, with Theorem B.3
E? is an extension of default theory (K?,W). (B.14)
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Next we show that default theory ∆? = (D?,E?) has an extension E. Without loss of
generality, let D? = D \ {δ | E? |= ¬Justif (δ)}. That is, for each δ ∈ D? the following
condition holds:
E? 6|= ¬Justif (δ). (B.15)
Assume there are defaults δ, δ′ ∈ D? such that (δ, δ′) ∈ A∆? for the block graph Γ∆? =
(V∆?,A∆?). Then, by Definition 3.3 there is B? ⊆D? with δ ∈B? such that B? ∈ B∆?(δ′).
Because K? is grounded in W and because of (B.13) and (B.15) there is a superset B of
B? such that B ∈ B∆(δ′). We distinguish the following three cases.
(1) Let B ∈K and δ′ ∈K?. We immediately get a contradiction to (B.10), because then
there would be a B ′ ∈K with δ′ ∈ B ′ such that (B,B ′) ∈AΩ∆ .
(2) Let B ∈ K and δ′ /∈ K?. Then B ⊆ K?. According to Definition 3.1 B ∈ B∆(δ′)
implies W ∪ Conseq(B) |= ¬Justif (δ′) and it follows E? |= ¬Justif (δ′). But this is
a contradiction to (B.15) since δ′ ∈D?.
(3) For the last case let B /∈ K (for δ′ ∈ K? or δ′ /∈ K?). Then (B.11) implies that
there is a B ′ ∈ K such that (B ′,B) ∈ AΩ∆ , which implies that there is a δ ∈ B
with B ′ ∈ B∆(δ). By Definition 3.1 it follows that W ∪ Conseq(B ′) |= ¬Justif (δ).
Since B ′ ∈K we have that W ∪Conseq(K?) |= ¬Justif (δ) and with (B.13) this is a
contradiction to δ ∈ B ⊆D? and (B.15).
In any case we obtain a contradiction, which shows that the assumption was false, hence,
there are no defaults δ, δ′ ∈D? such that (δ, δ′) ∈ A∆? for the block graph Γ∆? . In other
words∆? is non-conflicting and thus has an extension E, according to Theorem 4.1.
Next we prove that K? ⊆ GD(D,E). Let δ ∈ K?, then E |= Prereq(δ), because K? is
grounded in W and E? = Th(W ∪Conseq(K?)). According to Theorem 3.2 the following
condition is true
E 6|= ¬Justif (δ) iff there is no B ′ ⊆GD(D,E) such that B ′ ∈ B∆?(δ). (B.16)
Assume there is a B ′ ⊆ GD(D,E) such that B ′ ∈ B∆?(δ). Then we distinguish the
following two cases.
(1) Let B ′ ∈ K . Because δ ∈ K?, there is a B ∈ K with δ ∈ B and according to
Definition 4.1 we have (B ′,B) ∈ AΩ∆ and B,B ′ ∈ K . But this is impossible
according to (B.10).
(2) Let B ′ /∈ K . Then there is a B ∈ K such that (B,B ′) ∈ AΩ∆ . Therefore, there
is a δ ∈ B ′ such that E |= ¬Justif ( δ ), because B ⊆ K? ⊆ E? ⊆ E and thus
δ /∈GD(D,E). But this is a contradiction to δ ∈ B ′ ⊆GD(D,E).
With (B.16) it follows that E 6|= ¬Justif (δ) and we get that δ ∈ GD(D,E). Hence,
K? ⊆ GD(D,E). To sum up, we have seen that E? is an extension of (K?,W), (D,E?)
has extension E (because trivially ∆? = (D?,E?) and (D,E?) have the same extensions)
and GD(K?,E?)⊆GD(D,E). According to Lemma B.4 E is an extension of (D,W).
Let E be an extension of ∆ = (D,W) and define K = {B | B ∈ B∆(δ) for some δ ∈
D and B ⊆ GD(D,E)}. We show that K is an inverse kernel with respect to Ω∆ by
proving (B.10) and (B.11) for K .
Since B ⊆GD(D,E) for each B ∈K it follows by Definition 4.1 that K is independent
with respect to Ω∆, that is (B.10) holds for K . Otherwise GD(D,E) would not be weakly
regular (see Theorem 3.3).
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Now let B ∈ VΩ∆ \ K . Then there exists a δ ∈ B \ GD(D,E) such that W ∪
Conseq(GD(D,E)) |= ¬Justif (δ). If there would be no such δ in B then B would be a
subset of GD(D,E) because B is grounded in W . But this would imply that B is in K ,
which is a contradiction to B ∈ VΩ∆ \ K . From W ∪ Conseq(GD(D,E)) |= ¬Justif (δ)
we conclude with Theorem 3.3 that there is some B ′ ⊆ GD(D,E) such that B ′ ∈ B∆(δ).
This means that for each B ∈ VΩ∆ \K there is some B ′ ∈K such that (B ′,B) ∈ AΩ∆ , that
is (B.11). Hence K is an inverse kernel with respect to Ω∆. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.5. If C is an (directed) harmful, odd cycle in Γ∆ then there are only
arcs between defaults in C which belong to the cycle. Let C = {δ1, . . . , δ2n+1} and for each
16 i 6 2n+ 1 let Bi the blocking set of δi+1 such that δi ∈ Bi (see Definition 3.3). Since
C is harmful we have Bi = {δi} for each 16 i 6 2n+ 1.
Now assume ∆ has an extension E. Then we have E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E)))
and trivially not all of the above Bi can be subsets of GD(D,E). Thus without loss of
generality, assume B1 6⊆ GD(D,E). Since B1 is the only blocking set of B2 it follows
that B2 ⊆ GD(D,E). Hence, B3 6⊆ GD(D,E), because B2 ∈ B∆(δ3) and δ3 ∈ B3. After
repeating this argument n times it follows that B2n+1 6⊆ GD(D,E). But know we are able
to conclude that B1 ⊆ GD(D,E) with the same argumentation as above. This is, because
C is harmful. Therefore we obtain a contradiction, which shows that our assumption was
false, and thus ∆ has no extension. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.6. We prove the proposition by showing that ∆ is not ps-even under
the assumption that ∆ is not even. For definition of ps-even, G(∆) and odd cycles of
G(∆) used in this proof see [39]. So let ∆ be not even, that is, there is an odd cycle
C = {δ1, . . . , δ2n+1} in Γ∆. Then we have (δi, δi+1) ∈ A∆ for each 1 6 i < 2n + 1 and
(δ2n+1, δ1) ∈ A∆. According to Definition 3.3, for each i we have δi ∈ Bi for some
Bi ∈ B∆(δi+1). Thus by the definition of blocking sets
W ∪Conseq(Bi) |= ¬Justif (δi+1) and (B.17)
Bi is grounded in W. (B.18)
Before we continue, we give a translation of the second proposition of Lemma 1 in [39]
into our terminology. Let A,B ⊆D be subsets of defaults and δ, δ′ ∈D defaults. Then the
second proposition in Lemma 1 in [39] states(
W ∪Conseq(A) |= Prereq(δ′) and W ∪Conseq(B) 6|= ¬Justif (δ′)) and(
W ∪Conseq(A) 6|= Prereq(δ′) or W ∪Conseq(B ∪ {δ}) |= ¬Justif (δ′)) (B.19)
implies (δ, δ′) ∈E1.
Now let δi+1 ∈ Bi+1, A = Bi+1, B = Bi \ {δi} and δ = δi and δ′ = δi+1. Then (B.17),
(B.18) and (B.19) imply (δi, δi+1) ∈ E1 for each 1 6 i < 2n + 1 and with the same
argumentation (δ2n+1, δ1) ∈E1. Hence there is an odd cycle (as defined in [39]) in G(∆).
That is, ∆ is not ps-even and the proof is finished.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory and let A∆ = 〈T ,A, 〉 be
the corresponding assumption-based framework.
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Before staring with the actual proof, observe that we have the following lemma:
Lemma B.8. If (δ, δ′) is an arc in the block graph of ∆ then (Justif (δ), Justif (δ′)) is an
arc in the attack relationship graph of A.
This lemma is an immediate consequence from the definition of an attack and the
definition of the attack relationship graph in [5].
For the first part of the theorem let A∆ be stratified according to [5]. Then by Definition
7.2 in [5] there is no cycle in the attack relationship graph of A∆. Thus, according to
Lemma B.8 there is no cycle in the block graph of ∆. Hence ∆ is well-ordered.
Now let A∆ be order-consistent according to [5] and let G = (V ,A) be the attack
relationship graph corresponding to A∆. Bondarenko et al. define a relation ≺ between
two nodes v and v′ (v ≺ v′) iff there exists both a path with an even number of edges and
a path with an odd number of edges from v to v′ in G (see [5, Definition 7.6]). A∆ is
order-consistent iff the graph (V , {(v, v′) | v ≺ v′}) has no cycles. Now assume that there
is an odd cycle C in G. Then for any two nodes v, v′ in C there is both a path with an even
number of edges and a path with an odd number of edges from v to v′. If the shortest path
through the cycle C from v to v′ is even (odd) the path from v to v′ over v′ (adding one
run through the cycle to the original path from v to v′) is odd (even). Hence for any two
nodes v, v′ in C we have v ≺ v′ and graph (V , {(v, v′) | v ≺ v′}) has a cycles. That is, A∆
is not order-consistent.
Since A∆ is order-consistent the corresponding attack relationship graph has no odd
cycles. Then, according to Lemma B.8 there is no odd cycle in the block graph of ∆ and
∆ is even. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory and E an extension of ∆.
Then with Theorem B.3 we have
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E))) and (B.20)
GD(D,E) is grounded in W. (B.21)
For proving that GD(D,E) is protected in ∆ let δ ∈ GD(D,E). By definition of the
generating default rules for E, we know that E |= Prereq(δ) and E 6|= ¬Justif (δ).
Therefore GD(D,E) contains no blocking set of δ. Thus for each B ∈ B∆(δ) there exists
a δ′ ∈ B such that E |= ¬Justif (δ′), because by Definition 3.1 each blocking set B of
δ is grounded in W . Otherwise from (B.21) and an easy induction, it would follow that
B ⊆GD(D,E). More formally we have
∀B ∈ B∆(δ): ∃δ′ ∈B such that W ∪Conseq
(
GD(D,E)
) |= ¬Justif (δ′). (B.22)
According to Theorem 3.2 this implies
∀B ∈ B∆(δ): ∃δ′ ∈B: ∃B ′ ∈ B∆(δ′) such that B ′ ⊆GD(D,E). (B.23)
Thus, by Definition 3.4 for each δ ∈GD(D,E) exists a S ∈ S∆(δ) such that S ⊆GD(D,E)
and that is GD(D,E) is protected in ∆. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let D′ ⊆ GD(D,E) be a set of default rules such that D′ is
grounded inW . First, recall the following definition. For a setD′ of default rules we define
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D′ := {δ ∈D |W ∪ Conseq(D′) |= ¬Justif (δ)}. Let D′′ := D \ (D′ ∪D′) for the rest of
this proof.
Let E be an extension of ∆. According to Theorem B.3, we have
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E))) and
GD(D,E) is grounded in W.
(B.24)
Next we show GD(D,E)=GD(D′′,E)∪D′. Let δ ∈GD(D,E). According to definition,
it follows E |= Prereq(δ) and E 6|= ¬Justif (δ). If δ ∈ D′ we are ready. Let δ /∈ D′.
Because D′ ⊆GD(D,E) from E 6|= ¬Justif (δ) with (B.24) it follows W ∪Conseq(D′) 6|=
¬Justif (δ). That is, δ /∈ D′ and we conclude δ ∈ D′′. Since E |= Prereq(δ) and E 6|=
¬Justif (δ) it follows that δ ∈ GD(D′′,E) ∪D′. Now let δ ∈ GD(D′′,E) ∪D′. If δ ∈D′
we are ready, because D′ ⊆GD(D,E). Let δ /∈D′, that is, δ ∈GD(D′′,E). By definition,
we have E |= Prereq(δ) and E 6|= ¬Justif (δ), that is, δ ∈GD(D,E). All in all we obtain
GD(D,E)=GD(D′′,E)∪D′. (B.25)
From (B.24), (B.25) and the fact that D′ is grounded in W we conclude (see Lemma B.2)
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′ ∪GD(D′′,E))) and
GD(D′′,E) is grounded in W ∪Conseq(D′).
(B.26)
According to Theorem B.3, E is an extension of ∆|D′.
For the other direction let E be an extension of ∆|D′. According to Theorem B.3,
we have (B.26). Since D′ is grounded in W , according to Theorem B.2, it follows
that D′ ∪ GD(D′′,E) is grounded in W . By using (B.26) instead of (B.24), a similar
argumentation as above shows that (B.25) and thus (B.24) is also true under the current
premises. As above, it follows that E is an extension of ∆. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory and E an extension of ∆.
Then with Theorem B.3 we have
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E))) and (B.27)
GD(D,E) is grounded in W. (B.28)
If we set E′ =E and D′ =GD(D,E) then ∆|D′ = (D \GD(D,E),W ∪Conseq(GD(D,
E))).With the abbreviationsD′′ =D \GD(D,E) andW ′ =W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E)) and
Theorem B.3 E′ is an extension of ∆|D′ iff
E = Th(W ′ ∪Conseq(GD(D′′,E′))) and (B.29)
GD(D′′,E′) is grounded in W ′. (B.30)
Assume δ ∈ GD(D′′,E′). Then δ is not in GD(D,E) because D′′ = D \ GD(D,E),
that is E 6|= Prereq(δ) or E |= ¬Justif (δ). Because E = E′, this implies that δ is not in
GD(D′′,E′), which is a contradiction. Thus GD(D′′,E′) is empty. Now we have seen
(B.30) because the empty set trivially is grounded in W ′ and (B.29) follows from (B.27).
That is E′ is an extension of ∆|D′.
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It remains to show thatD′ is grounded in W and protected in ∆. That D′ is grounded in
W follows immediately from (B.28) and D′ is protected in ∆ according to Theorem 5.1.
For the other direction let
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)∪E′) (B.31)
for a D′ ⊆D such that D′ is grounded in W , D′ is protected in ∆ and E′ is an extension
of default theory∆|D′. If we setD′′ =D \D′ then for∆|D′ = (D′′,W ∪Conseq(D′)) we
have
E′ = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′ ∪GD(D′′,E′))) and (B.32)
GD(D′′,E′) is grounded in W ∪Conseq(D′) (B.33)
according to Theorem B.3. Therefore we have
E =E′. (B.34)
Next we show D′ ⊆ GD(D,E). According to Definition 5.1 for each δ ∈D′ we have
the following two conditions:
B ⊆D′ for no B ∈ B∆(δ) (B.35)
S ⊆D′ for some S ∈ S∆(δ). (B.36)
Let δ ∈ D′. With the groundedness of D′ and (B.32) we have E |= Prereq(δ). Assume
E |= ¬Justif (δ). Then with (B.32) and (B.34) we have that D′ ∪ GD(D′′,E′) is not
weakly regular. According to Theorem 3.3 there is some δ′ ∈D′ ∪GD(D′′,E′) and some
B ′ ⊆ D′ ∪ GD(D′′,E′) such that B ′ ∈ B∆(δ′). With (B.31) and (B.32) it follows that
E′ |= ¬Justif (δ′). Therefore
δ′ /∈GD(D′′,E′). (B.37)
We distinguish the following cases:
(1) B ′ ⊆D′ and δ′ ∈D′:
In this case we obtain a contradiction to (B.36), because D′ contains a default and
one of its blocking sets.
(2) B ′ ⊆D′ and δ′ /∈D′:
In this case we have δ′ ∈GD(D′′,E′) which is a contradiction to (B.37).
(3) B ′ 6⊆D′ and δ′ ∈D′:
In this case we have D′ ∩GD(D′′,E′) 6= ∅.
(4) B ′ 6⊆D′ and δ′ /∈D′:
Again, we have δ′ ∈GD(D′′,E′) which is a contradiction to (B.37).
Therefore the assumption is false and we have E 6|= ¬Justif (δ) which implies
D′ ⊆GD(D,E). (B.38)
Finally, we show that GD(D,E)=D′ ∪GD(D′′,E′).
Let δ ∈ GD(D,E), then by definition E |= Prereq(δ) and E 6|= ¬Justif (δ). If δ ∈ D′
we are ready, because of (B.38). Let δ /∈ D′. From E |= Prereq(δ) and (B.34) we
conclude E′ |= Prereq(δ). From E 6|= ¬Justif (δ) we get E′ 6|= ¬Justif (δ). Therefore
δ ∈GD(D′′,E′) which implies GD(D,E)⊆D′ ∪GD(D′′,E′).
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Now let δ ∈ D′ ∪ GD(D′′,E′). If δ ∈ GD(D′′,E′) then by definition we have E′ |=
Prereq(δ) which impliesE |= Prereq(δ) and E′ 6|= ¬Justif (δ). From (B.34) it follows E 6|=
¬Justif (δ) and also δ ∈ GD(D,E). That is, for the first case we get D′ ∪ GD(D′′,E′) ⊆
GD(D,E). For the second case let δ /∈GD(D′′,E′), that is δ ∈D′. With (B.38) it follows
δ ∈GD(D,E).
Finally we obtain GD(D,E) = D′ ∪ GD(D′′,E′). According to (B.31) and (B.32) it
follows E = Th(W ∪GD(D,E)). Because D′ is grounded in W with (B.33) we conclude
that GD(D,E) is grounded in W . Therefore Theorem B.3 implies that E is an extension
of ∆. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.4. If E is an extension of (D,W) then according to Theorem B.3 we
have
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E))). (B.39)
According to definition of generating defaults (see (2)) for each default rule δ not in
GD(D,E) we have
E 6|= Prereq(δ) or E |= ¬Justif (δ). (B.40)
Set ∆′ = (D′,W ′) = ∆|GD(D,E) then by definition we have D′ = D \ (GD(D,E) ∪
GD(D,E) ) andW ′ =W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E)). It remains to show that A∆′ = ∅, because
then ∆′ is non-conflicting.
Assume (δ1, δ2) ∈A∆′ for δ1, δ2 ∈D′, that is δ1 and δ2 are not in the generating defaults
of extension E, that is (B.40) holds for δ1 and δ2. According to Definitions 3.3 and 3.1,
exists a B ⊆ D′ such that δ1 ∈ B and B ∈ B∆(δ2), because (δ1, δ2) ∈ A∆′ . That is in
particular B is grounded in W ′. According to the definition of |, we have W ′ 6|= ¬Justif (δ)
for each δ in B . For each δ in B we have W ′ 6|= Prereq(δ) because of (B.39) and (B.40).
This implies that B is not grounded in W ′ which is a contradiction to (B.39). Thus our
assumption was false and for all δ1, δ2 ∈B we have (δ1, δ2) /∈A∆′ That is, the block graph
Γ∆|GD(D,E) has no arcs and by definition ∆′ =∆|GD(D,E) is non-conflicting. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.5. This result is obtained as a direct consequence of the proof of
Theorem 4.1. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.6. Let E be an extension of ∆. Theorems 5.1 and 5.4 imply that
GD(D,E) is protected in ∆ and Γ∆|GD(D,E) is arcless, respectively.
Assume that GD(D,E) is not maximal such that GD(D,E) is grounded in W and
protected in ∆. Then there is a superset D′′ of GD(D,E) for which the above conditions
hold. That is, there is a δ ∈ D′′ and δ /∈ GD(D,E) such that E |= Prereq(δ). Since
D′′ is protected in ∆, according to Theorem 3.3, D′′ is weakly regular. Therefore we
have E 6|= ¬Justif (δ) and it follows that δ ∈ GD(D,E) which is a contradiction. Hence
GD(D,E) is a maximal set with the desired properties.
For the other direction let E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)) for some maximal D′ ⊆ D such
that D′ is grounded in W and protected in ∆. Set (D′′,W ′′)=∆|D′, then D′′ =D \ (D′ ∪
D′) and W ′′ =W ∪Conseq(D′).
According to Theorem 5.8, we haveA∆|D′ ⊆ A∆. Since∆ is even∆|D′ is even and thus
has an extension E′. According to Theorem 5.3, we have that E′ = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′ ∪
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GD(D′′,E′))) is an extension of ∆. Theorems B.3 and 5.1 imply that D′ ∪GD(D,E) is
grounded in W and protected in ∆.
Since D′ was a maximal set being grounded in W and protected in ∆ we have
GD(D′′,E′)= ∅.
Finally, this implies E′ =E and we obtain E is an extension of ∆. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.7. Let E be an extension of ∆. According to Theorem B.3, we have
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E))) and
GD(D,E) is grounded in W.
Theorems 5.1 and 5.4 imply that GD(D,E) is protected in ∆ and Γ∆|GD(D,E) is arcless,
respectively.
Assume that GD(D,E) is not maximal such that GD(D,E) is grounded inW , protected
in ∆ and Γ∆|D′ is arcless. Then there is a superset D′′ of GD(D,E) for which the above
conditions hold. That is, there is a δ ∈ D′′ and δ /∈ GD(D,E) such that E |= Prereq(δ).
Since D′′ is protected in ∆, according to Theorem 3.3, D′′ is weakly regular. Therefore
we have E 6|= ¬Justif (δ) and it follows that δ ∈GD(D,E) which is a contradiction. Hence
GD(D,E) is a maximal set with the desired properties.
For the other direction let E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)) for some maximal D′ ⊆ D such
that D′ is grounded in W and protected in ∆ and Γ∆|D′ is arcless (that is, ∆|D′ is non-
conflicting). Set (D′′,W ′′)=∆|D′, thenD′′ =D \ (D′ ∪D′) andW ′′ =W ∪Conseq(D′).
Next, we show D′ = GD(D,E). Since D′ is grounded and protected, by definition, we
know that D′ ⊆ GD(D,E). Let δ ∈ GD(D,E) then E |= Prereq(δ) and E 6|= ¬Justif (δ).
Assume δ /∈ D′. Then δ /∈ D′ ∪ D′, that is, δ ∈ D′′. Since D′ is maximal set with the
above properties, for D′ ∪ {δ} not all properties (grounded in W and protected in ∆ and
Γ∆|(D′∪{δ}) arcless) hold. Because D′ ∪ {δ} is grounded in W , we know that D′ ∪ {δ} is
not protected in ∆ or for D′ ∪ {δ} we have that Γ∆|(D′∪{δ}) is not arcless. But Γ∆|(D′∪{δ})
is arcless since Γ∆|D′ is arcless and D′ ⊆D′ ∪ {δ}. That is, D′ ∪ {δ} is not protected in ∆.
ThenD′ ∪ {δ} is not weakly regular or it contains no supporting set for δ. AssumeD′ ∪ {δ}
is not weakly regular. According to Theorem 3.3, we have that there is a δ′ ∈D′ ∪ {δ} and
a B ′ ∈ B∆(δ′) such that B ′ ⊆D′ ∪ {δ}. We have the following two cases.
(1) If B ′ ⊆ D′ then W ∪ Conseq(D′) |= ¬Justif (δ′). But this is a contradiction to
D′ protected in ∆ or δ ∈ GD(D,E), depending on whether δ′ ∈ D′ or δ′ = δ,
respectively.
(2) If B ′ 6⊆D′ then we know that δ ∈B ′. Again we have two cases:
(a) δ′ ∈ D′. Since D′ is protected there is a supporting set S of δ′ such that
S ⊆ D′ and S ∈ B∆(δ) because otherwise D′ would not be protected. Hence
E |= ¬Justif (δ) which is a contradiction to E 6|= ¬Justif (δ) (see above).
(b) δ′ /∈ D′ implies δ′ = δ. We have that Γ∆|D′ is not arcless, because {δ} ∈
B∆|D′(δ). This follows form the fact that for each single default δ and each
default theory ∆ form {δ} 7→∆ δ′ it follows that {δ} ∈ B∆(δ′). Again this is a
contradiction.
Therefore the assumption was false and D′ ∪ {δ} is weakly regular with respect to W .
Now assume that D′ ∪ {δ} contains no supporting set for δ. That is, δ has supporting sets
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different from empty set. Therefore, according to Definition 3.4, B∆(δ) 6= ∅. And for all
blocking sets B ∈ B∆(δ) we have that B 6⊆ D′ ∪ {δ}, because otherwise D′ ∪ {δ} would
not be weakly regular with respect to W . Since D′ contains no supporting set for δ it
follows that there is a B ∈ B∆(δ) such that B ⊆ D′ ∪ D′′. From δ ∈ D′′ we conclude
W ′′ =W ∪Conseq(D′) 6|= ¬Justif (δ). Therefore there exists a minimal B ′′ ⊆ B ∩D′′ such
that B ′′ 7→∆|D′ δ. That is,
B ′′ ⊆ B. (B.41)
If we assume B ′′ /∈ B∆|D′(δ) there is a B ′ ⊂ B ′′ and a δ′ ∈ B ′′ such that B ′ 7→∆|D′ δ′
(see Theorem 3.1). Now (B.41) implies B ′ ⊂ B and δ′ ∈ B . Then B ′ ∪ (B \ B ′′) ⊂ B
and B ′ ∪ (B \ B ′′) 7→∆ δ′, that is, B /∈ B∆(δ). But this is a contradiction and we obtain
B ′′ ∈ B∆|D′(δ). Now this again is a contradiction to the fact that Γ∆|D′ is arcless. Thus our
initial assumption was false, that is there is a supporting set for δ in D′ ∪ {δ} and therefore
D′ ∪ {δ} is protected in ∆. This is a contradiction to the maximality of D′ and hence the
assumption that δ /∈D′ was false.
We have seen that D′ = GD(D,E) and according to Theorem B.3, E is an extension
of ∆. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.8. Let D′ ⊆D a set of default rules which is is grounded in W and
protected in ∆. Set ∆|D′ = (D′′,W ′′). Then by Definition 5.2 of | we have
W ′′ =W ∪Conseq(D′),
D′′ =D \ (D′ ∪D′ )
where D′ = {δ ∈D |W ∪Conseq(D′) |= ¬Justif (δ)}.
(B.42)
If (δ?, δ) ∈A∆|D′ then by Definition 3.3 there is some B? ∈ B∆|D′(δ) such that δ? ∈ B?. By
Definition 3.1 we have that B? 7→∆|D′ δ and BS3 hold for B?. From B? 7→∆|D′ δ it follows
that there is a minimal B ⊂D with B = B? ∪B for a B ⊆D′ and B 7→∆ δ. According to
Theorem 3.1, B ∈ B∆(δ) iff for each δ′ ∈ B and each B ′ ⊂ B we have B ′ 67→∆ δ′. Assume
B /∈ B∆(δ), that is, there is a δ′ ∈ B and a B ′ ⊂ B such that B ′ 7→∆ δ′. By definition it
follows W ∪ Conseq(B ′) |= ¬Justif (δ′). Furthermore, by monotonicity of |=, we obtain
W ∪ Conseq(B) |= ¬Justif (δ′) and δ′ ∈ B . That is, B is not weakly regular. Theorem 3.3
implies the existence of δ′′ ∈ B and B ′′ ⊂ B such that B ′′ ∈ B∆(δ′′). We distinguish the
following cases:
(1) B ′′ ⊆D′ and δ′′ ∈D′:
In this case we obtain a contradiction to the fact thatD′ is a protected default proof,
because it contains a default and one of its blocking sets (see Definition 6.2).
(2) B ′′ ⊆D′ and δ′′ /∈D′:
Since δ′′ ∈ B and B = B?∪B for B ⊆D′ and B? ⊆D′′ we conclude δ′′ ∈B? ⊆D′′.
Since B ′′ is a blocking set of δ′′ with (B.42) and B ′′ ⊆D′ we have δ′′ /∈D′′, which
is a contradiction.
(3) B ′′ 6⊆D′ and δ′′ ∈D′:
In this case there exists a δ ∈ B ′′ such that δ /∈ D′ (that is δ ∈ D′′). Furthermore,
D′ contains a blocking set of δ, because D′ is protected in ∆ and δ′′ ∈ D′. Thus
by (B.42) δ /∈D′′ which is a contradiction.
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(4) B ′′ 6⊆D′ and δ′′ /∈D′:
Then δ′′ ∈ B?. If δ′′ ∈ B ′′ we obtain a contradiction to the fact that Γ∆ has no self
loops. If δ′′ /∈ B ′′ we have that B? 6= B ′′. Therefore B? ∩B ′′ ⊂ B? and δ′′ ∈ B? such
that (B ′′ ∩B?) 7→∆ δ′′. But this is a contradiction to B? ∈ B∆|D′(δ).
Hence the above assumption was false and B ∈ B∆(δ). Finally, we conclude that A∆|D′ ⊆
A∆. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.9. Let ∆ = (D,W), D? = γ ?(D′) for some D′ ⊆ D and ∆? =
(D?,W). Furthermore let E? be an extension of ∆?. Then GD(D?,E?) is protected in
∆?. Clearly, GD(D?,E?) is also protected in ∆ since D? ⊆D.
Let E′ be an extension of ∆|GD(D?,E?), which exists because ∆|GD(D?,E?) is
coherent. Because GD(D?,E?) is grounded in W , Theorem 5.3 implies that E =
Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D?,E?))∪E′) is an extension of ∆. Since E? = Th(W ∪
Conseq(GD(D?,E?))) we conclude E? ⊆E. 2
Proof of Corollary 6.1. This corollary follows directly from Theorem 5.3. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a non-conflicting default theory and E an
extension of∆ with ϕ ∈E. Then with Theorem B.3 we have E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,
E))) and GD(D,E) is grounded in W. Let Dp = GD(D,E), then P2 and P1 are trivially
true. Thus Dp is a pure default proof for ϕ from ∆.
For the other direction let Dp be a pure default proof for ϕ from ∆. Then by
Definition 6.1 P2 and P1 hold for Dp . Since ∆ is non-conflicting it has an unique
extension E = Th(W ∪Conseq(D′)) whereD′ ⊆D is a maximal subset of defaults which
is grounded in W (see proof of Theorem 4.1). Because according to P1 Dp is grounded in
W it follows that Dp ⊆D′. Therefore from P2 it follows that E is an extension of ∆ with
ϕ ∈E. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Without loss of generality, let P ⊆ D be minimal, pure default
proof for ϕ from ∆. Let ∆? = (γ ?(P ),W). If default theory ∆? has an extension E
with ϕ ∈ E then, according to Theorem 5.1 the corresponding set of generating defaults
GD(γ ?(P ),E) is protected in∆? and grounded inW . According to the definition of γ ?(P )
there are no arcs (δ′, δ) in Γ∆ such that δ′ ∈D \ γ ?(P ) and δ ∈ γ ?(P ). Thus B ∈ B∆(δ)
implies B ⊆ γ ?(P ) for each δ ∈ γ ?(P ). Since γ ?(P ) ⊆ D with Theorem 3.4 we have
B∆?(δ) ⊆ B∆(δ) for each δ ∈ γ ?(P ). B ∈ B∆(δ) implies B ⊆ γ ?(P ). Hence, according
to Theorem 3.4 we have B ∈ B∆?(δ). In all we get B∆?(δ) = B∆(δ) for each δ ∈ γ ?(P ).
Therefore GD(γ ?(P ),E) is also protected in ∆ (see Definition 5.1 and Theorem 3.4).
Hence GD(γ ?(P ),E) is a protected default proof for ϕ from ∆.
Proof of Theorem 6.4. Let ∆= (D,W) be a even default theory and E an extension of
∆ with ϕ ∈E. Then with Theorem B.3 we have
E = Th(W ∪Conseq(GD(D,E))) and (B.43)
GD(D,E) is grounded in W. (B.44)
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We setDϕ =GD(D,E) and prove thatDϕ is a protected default proof for ϕ from∆. (B.43)
and (B.44) imply that conditions P2 and P1 hold for Dϕ . Thus PP1 holds. Theorem 5.1
implies that Dϕ is protected in ∆ (that is PP2) and thus a protected default proof for ϕ.
For the other direction let Dϕ be a protected default proof for ϕ from ∆. Then by
Definition 6.2 we have PP1 and PP2 for Dϕ . According to Theorem 5.8 we have that
A∆|Dϕ ⊆ A∆, which implies that ∆|Dϕ is even, because ∆ is even. Now let E′ be an
extension of ∆|Dϕ (E′ exists according to Theorem 4.2) and set E = Th(Dϕ ∪E′). Then,
according to Corollary 6.1, E is an extension of ∆ with ϕ ∈E. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.5. Let∆= (D,W) be a default theory and E an extension of∆ with
ϕ ∈E. Set Dϕ =GD(D,E). Observe that in the first half of the proof of Theorem 6.4 we
do not have used that ∆ is even. Therefore here the same argumentation applies to show
DP1, that isDϕ is a protected default proof for ϕ from∆. According to Theorem 5.4∆|Dϕ
is non-conflicting, that is DP2. ThusDϕ is a (general) default proof for ϕ.
For the other direction let Dϕ be a (general) default proof for ϕ from ∆, that is DP1
and DP2 hold for Dϕ . Therefore Dϕ is a protected default proof, that is PP1 and PP2
hold for Dϕ , according to Definition 6.2. According to Definition 6.1 P2 and P1 follow
for Dp because Dp is also a pure default proof. By DP2 ∆|Dϕ is has an extension E′. Set
E = Th(Dϕ ∪E′), then by Corollary 6.1 E is a classical extension of ∆ with ϕ ∈E. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.6. This theorem follows immediately from Theorem 6.5 because the
extension-membership problem is in 6P2 [25]. 2
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